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WTO Negotiations on Agriculture:  




This IATRC commissioned paper reviews WTO rules about product attribute regulations 
and evaluates the prospects for resolution of some of the current and potential disagreements 
over attribute-based trade restrictions.  Rules for the regulation of agricultural product attributes 
were presumably settled during the last round of multilateral trade negotiations.  A new SPS 
Agreement established more specific disciplines for the regulation of safety attributes; the GATT 
and TBT Agreements set out revised rules for the regulation of other quality attributes; and the 
new TRIPS Agreement included provisions protecting the use of geographical indicators which 
are frequently used to differentiate agricultural products in the marketplace.  However, interest in 
revisiting the rules for product attribute regulation in the ongoing agriculture negotiations has 
grown dramatically in recent months as government seek additional latitude, discipline, or clarity 
about their multilateral commitments in the wake of events which have disrupted the consensus 
achieved in the Uruguay Round. 
 
The introduction provides an overview of the WTO disciplines, the disputes related to 
their enforcement, and the negotiating proposals that urge their revision.  The second section of 
the paper reviews the SPS Agreement, examines the impact it has had on the world trading 
system, and considers whether initiatives set out in the submissions will compromise or improve 
it.  The third section of the paper turns to the effectiveness of the rules set out by the TBT and 
TRIPS Agreements for the use of standards and labeling in the regulation of other quality 
attributes including nutritional, sensory, functional, and process characteristics.  Issues in the 
regulation of genetically modified products are discussed in the fourth section of the paper.  The 
fifth section examines the impact of product attribute regulations on developing countries and 
evaluates the mechanisms set out in the Uruguay Round agreements that were intended to foster 
the integration of these countries into the world economy.  The paper ends with a summary of the 
analysis, and conclusions about the potential for changes in WTO rules on product attribute 
regulations that further the objective of increasing welfare-enhancing trade. 
 
Regulation of Safety and Other Quality Attributes   
The principles and mechanisms of the SPS Agreement have been more successful in 
resolving differences over animal and plant health regulations than in resolving disputes over 
food safety measures, where a tension between consumer protection and consumer gains from 
trade is evident.  While a consensus exists around the fundamental requirement of the SPS 
agreement that food safety measures be based on scientific risk assessments, there are varying 
views on other risk management principles—in short, how much latitude is implied by the words 
“based on?”  The EU, Japan, Switzerland, and other countries favor explicit recognition of the 
legitimacy of the precautionary principle and “other legitimate factors” in SPS policies, while 
countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand favor current WTO 
rules.  One option for conflict resolution would be to allow greater flexibility for countries to set 
standards—when, for example, consumers place “inconsistent” valuations on risks from different 
sources, or perceive unknown risks as more important—but only when allowing greater market  
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access.  Such an arrangement could break the perceived link between farm income support and 
stringent SPS measures, which are both positively correlated with income.    
 
The impact of the TBT Agreement on the regulation of other quality attributes of 
agricultural products is more difficult to ascertain: no dispute panel reports (related to food or 
any other products) have been decided on the basis of this agreement.  Yet despite current 
uncertainties about the rules, there is substantial evidence of countries’ increased interest in 
quality standards and labeling to achieve a wide array of objectives.  Although some standards 
primarily address producers’ interests (such as compatibility standards that reduce transactions 
costs in supply chains), most recent regulatory activity appears to be directed at addressing 
consumer concerns.  In particular, the concept of “a consumer’s right to know” has recently 
spurred initiatives in some countries to require labeling of process and production methods for 
agricultural products.  It is anticipated that labeling will be more widely used for a greater range 
of purposes in coming years, and as a result, the TBT Agreement will have a greater role to play 
in setting the rules for international trade in food products.   
 
GMO Regulation 
An examination of the issues and evidence related to the regulation of GM products since 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round provides a prism on the challenges to the multilateral 
trading system arising from product attribute regulations.  In net exporting countries such as the 
United States and Canada, the doctrine of substantial equivalence has in general led to speedier 
approvals for GM products and the adoption of voluntary labeling schemes.  In net importing 
countries such as the EU and Japan, the precautionary principle has been invoked to justify 
longer (or suspended) approval processes and mandatory labeling regimes.  The economic costs 
of the divergence in GMO policy regimes could be high, especially for developing countries that 
depend on revenues from exports to developed countries. If positions harden and a rigid 
bifurcation of regulatory regimes emerges less than ten years after GMO crop production took 
off in the mid 1990s, it could set back agricultural trade liberalization in much the way that 
exclusion of agriculture from the GATT postponed reform by nearly half a century.  The  
outcome of any discussions about GM regulation in the current negotiations may have important 
implications for other systemic issues before the WTO, including the predictability of access to 
markets for products of novel technologies in the future, and labeling production and processing 
methods for food products. 
 
Developing Country Perspectives 
Several negotiating proposals tabled by developing countries indicated frustration with 
the increasingly exigent standards faced by their exports, the new obligations to justify their own 
product attribute regimes, or both.  To the extent that regulatory authorities adopt stringent 
regimes without full consideration of their costs, those costs (but few benefits) may fall hard on 
developing countries.  To the extent that product standards are market-demand driven, the 
markets will squeeze out inefficient firms, regardless of location.  Private resources will be 
forthcoming to meet the standards when profitable opportunities can be captured, but such 
investments are often contingent on adequate public quarantine, testing, and/or certification 
services.  The case for increased technical assistance to developing countries is therefore clear.  
It is doubtful that special and differential treatment, which provides an easy way to postpone  
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necessary investments in regulatory infrastructure, is in the long term interests of developing 
countries.   
 
Additional Clarity, Discipline or Latitude in Current Rules? 
With all of these issues at play, the current round of agriculture negotiations can be 
characterized as one in which governments are seeking additional latitude, discipline or clarity 
with respect to their multilateral commitments regarding product attribute regulations. The case 
for additional clarity about the existing legal obligations is strong. Simply dismissing as 
protectionist any initiative to discuss risk management principles, the regulation of production 
and processing methods, or labeling regimes not only hardens opposition to further trade 
liberalization among some constituency groups, it also squanders an important opportunity to 
examine how trade can contribute to providing consumers with desired products in the most cost-
effective manner. We argue that the whole attributes/trade debate could constructively be turned 
to shift the focus from expanded trade as a threat to desired product attributes to expanded trade 
as a resource efficient means to achieve those attributes.    
 
Contrary to the case for additional clarity, proposals that seek additional latitude for 
policy interventions may obfuscate the language of the WTO disciplines on product attribute 
regulations. To the extent that the negotiations provide more latitude for countries to respond to 
revealed or perceived domestic demands for product standards with regulatory decision making, 
the goal of the WTO should be to ensure that this latitude does not limit trade. Some of the calls 
for additional regulatory latitude appear to be designed with other social goals in mind, and to 
this extent are disingenuous when cast as questions of regulatory policy related to product 
attributes.  
 
The most difficult of the three issues to address is whether stronger disciplines on product 
attribute regulations should be sought in the WTO agreements through the current negotiations. 
There is a consensus to not formally reopen the SPS and TBT agreements, but language could be 
included in a new agriculture agreement that would strengthen those aspects of the WTO rules 
that require scientific risk assessments, limit deviations from international standards, or 
otherwise tighten the criteria for a legitimate product attribute regulation. 
 
The problems with writing additional disciplines into the WTO rules are at least twofold. 
First, it is difficult (and usually inadvisable) to try to write general language to try to secure 
specific outcomes for specific cases.  Second, debates over product attribute regulations that 
affect trade is usually part of a larger contest over all regulation.  Within this larger debate, 
economics recommends the merit of market-based solutions over rigid command and control 
rules, careful assessments of the costs of regulation, and weighing the costs against the benefits 
that are derived.  Because product attribute regulations in many instances address market failures 
in order to achieve greater consumer welfare, it is one area where consumers do not gain 
unambiguously from trade.  This creates a different political economy for WTO negotiations: 
tighter disciplines on product attribute regulation will meet with political resistance from some 
consumer groups, in addition to protected producers.  The integration of domestic and trade 
policies has been recognized under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and the legitimacy of 
the WTO in setting limits on domestic policy regimes has been established. These principles also  
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apply to product attribute regulations. But it is unrealistic to expect WTO disciplines alone to 
resolve the broader debate over if, when, and how governments should regulate.       
 
 Acknowledging these limitations about what can be accomplished in the current 
international negotiations is not to preclude the WTO from serving a useful role in disciplining 
product attribute regulation multilaterally. The effort to secure global integration of agricultural 
markets can limit regulatory excesses when those excesses blatantly restrict trade. This will 
pressure countries to weigh benefits and costs more carefully than they otherwise would—and 
the WTO provides an institutional setting for market participants likely to bear the costs to be 
heard. This is exactly analogous with the role of the WTO in traditional trade policy. Odds seem 
at least even for as much progress in the next decade on limiting product attribute restrictions on 




Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the adequacy of multilateral rules for 
measures that regulate product attributes has been called into question by new production 
technologies, new disease outbreaks, and new constituents’ demands for agricultural regulations. 
During the last round, countries negotiated four agreements – the revised GATT and TBT 
Agreements and the new SPS and TRIPS Agreements – which increased both the scope and the 
specificity of disciplines on the application of safety and quality regulations.  Re-negotiation of 
these four agreements was not foreseen as part of the built-in agenda for the Agreement on 
Agriculture negotiations beginning in 2000, nor did any country formally propose reopening 
them during interim reviews by the relevant WTO committees. Yet interest in revisiting the rules 
for product attribute regulation in the ongoing agriculture negotiations has grown dramatically in 
recent months as governments seek additional latitude, discipline, or clarity about their 
multilateral commitments in the wake of events which have disrupted the consensus achieved in 
the Uruguay Round.  
 
Several of the events propelling the renewed interest in product attribute regulations are 
well known. The emergence of genetically modified products in agricultural markets and a series 
of BSE and FMD disease outbreaks in Europe have led to calls for the agreements to give 
governments more allowance in regulating risks. Greater accommodation of government efforts 
to respond to a range of concerns unrelated to safety is also urged by consumer and 
environmental advocates. These new demandeurs have been vocal about the need for the WTO 
to explicitly recognize the legitimacy of government regulations that either ensure specific 
attributes or information about such attributes. They advance this approach as an enlightened 
strategy for the entry of agriculture into the “century of quality, not quantity.” 
 
Net agricultural exporters have pointed out that if such initiatives are pursued, they could 
diminish previously negotiated gains in market access if advocated measures either bar or hinder 
entry for certain products. The exporting countries, including a growing coalition of developing 
countries, instead favor commitments that more explicitly delineate acceptable trade-restricting 
government responses to (potentially malleable) consumer concerns. Their proposals reflect 
frustration with the current rules, and with WTO jurisprudence that has interpreted these rules, 
which in their view have sometimes failed to forestall the unjustified use of measures to 
stigmatize products or limit market access. Thus, six years after the issues related to product 
attribute regulation were presumably resolved by the Uruguay Round agreements, the proposals 
in the current negotiations demonstrate a remarkable divergence of views over appropriate rules 
to determine how governments regulate safety or differentiate products in international markets. 
 
 
Product Attribute Commitments 
 
Product attribute measures, when legitimate, correct market failures.
1  Measures of 
greatest importance to trade in agricultural products include sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
                                                 
1 This paper only addresses regulatory measures. Fiscal measures that may be used to correct market failures are 
covered in discussion of the “green box” category in the commissioned paper on domestic support policies.   
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measures, food standards, and food labeling regulations. Such measures provide public goods (in 
terms of jointness of consumption), and the economic rationale for some level of government 
intervention is clear. Quarantine measures can prevent the entry and spread of animal or plant 
health hazards more efficiently than individual producer efforts, and mandatory shelf-life labels 
for domestic and imported food can assure consumers of desired levels of freshness without 
requiring prohibitive search costs. In other cases, standards are club goods which are excludable 
but not rival  (e.g., wine’s appellation contrôlée) so that producers can privately appropriate the 
surplus generated by their application. Product attribute regulations will reflect each country’s 
preferences, endowments, and technological possibilities; it follows that there is no presumption 
that such measures should be the same among nations. Even countries with similar preferences 
will have different regulations, and differences in their measures can and do disrupt trade. 
 
The negotiators of the original GATT recognized that the strategic application of 
technical regulations based on product attributes could be used by countries to the disadvantage 
of their trading partners, resulting in inefficient market allocations and trade flows. The original 
GATT, the Tokyo Round TBT Agreement and the Uruguay Round agreements set forth rules for 
these regulations designed to limit such abuses. The coverage of the four Uruguay Round 
agreements is summarized in Figure 1.1, and the specific disciplines of each of the current 
agreements are discussed and analyzed in the subsequent sections of this commissioned paper.  
 
There are three general points of distinction between the policy reforms indicated in these 
agreements and those of the Agreement on Agriculture. First, the capacity of the product 
attribute measures to increase welfare is universally recognized: multilateral rules aim to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of these measures, not to eventually 
eliminate them. Second, countries were obligated to bring each measure into compliance with the 
rules from the day they ratified the Uruguay Round agreements; hence, policy reforms were not 
phased in according to a schedule of negotiated concessions (as they are for tariffs, for example) 
and there is no provision for delaying compliance for measures related to sensitive sectors.
2 
Third, required reforms under these agreements are more modest than eventually envisioned for 
production- and trade-distorting measures that fall outside of the Agreement on Agriculture’s 
green box: strict compliance with the agreements that discipline product attribute regulations 
leaves scope for importing countries to maintain or adopt trade-restrictive measures even when 
these measures fail to increase domestic welfare (Roberts, 2000).  
 
To see this, we present a diagram (adapted from Snape and Orden, 2001) which 
illustrates the WTO-legal versus the benefit-cost approaches to policy decisions about trade of 
products that may entail adverse consequences, such as SPS risks or welfare losses related to the 
consumption of products deemed somehow “inferior.”   The horizontal axis of Figure 1.2 
measures the dollar value of the risk (weighted by probabilities) or cost of an undesirable 
attribute resulting from trading of a product. The vertical axis of Figure 1.2 shows the other net 
benefit from importing a product. These benefits are the traditional gains from trade. For any 
given product, the expenses of treatment, testing, or certification enter into determining both 
 
 
                                                 
2 Except for developing countries which were given until 2000 to meet certain requirements (longer for certain 
aspects of TRIPS).  
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Figure 1.1. GATT Legal Infrastructure for Product Attribute Measures 
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 the costs from risk/adverse consequences and the other net benefit.  
 
With both the adverse consequences and the other net benefit shown in dollar terms (and 
with consistent time discounting), a 45-degree line from the origin indicates the equating of the 
expected positive and negative effects of trade. Based on economic benefit-cost criteria, under a 
neutral policy attitude toward risk, all products with coordinates that are located above the 45-
degree line (after treatment, testing or certification) would be imported.
3 Those products that 
cannot be raised above the line would not be imported.  
 
Most of the general rules of the Agreement on Agriculture can be viewed as focusing on 
the vertical axis of Figure 1.2. For products recognized as posing no risk or meeting commonly 
recognized standards of the exporter and importer, the coordinates lie on the vertical axis and are 
above the 45-degree line (at the origin). The objective for these products is to facilitate the 
reduction of trade and domestic support policies that distort markets. Leaving aside large-country 
optimal tariff and similar arguments, reduction of these trade barriers and subsidies is in the 
national economic interest of the individual member country. But for various political economy 
reasons, countries often fail to remove trade barriers and subsidies unilaterally, with detrimental 
effects on their trade partners. The Agreement on Agriculture is the institutional response 
designed to facilitate mutually beneficial trade barrier and subsidy reductions. The underlying 
aim is to achieve the gains from trade by facilitating the international movement of products that 
lie on the vertical axis of Figure 1.2. 
 
The WTO provisions that discipline product attribute regulations can be viewed as 
predominantly concerned with the horizontal rather than vertical axis of the figure. The primary 
aim is to bind countries’ policies away from the origin: if no legitimate objective related to risk 
or adverse consequences can be substantiated, then product attribute policies are not to be 
established to limit trade. A classic nonagricultural example of such a case under the Tokyo 
Round TBT Agreement is provided by the 1986 Japanese ski standards dispute. In this case, 
American and European exporters successfully argued that evidence did not support a Japanese 
claim that imported skis could not safely function on the snow in Japan, and the case was settled 
in formal consultations before reaching a panel. However, if the regulation under consideration is 
judged to fulfill a legitimate objective with respect to risk or adverse consequences, then the 
WTO agreements allow restrictions on trade. Even if the negative consequences are very small 
(but non-zero) each country retains the sovereign right to set its own regulatory standards, 
subject to WTO rules on national treatment and nondiscrimination.  
 
The second general criteria for regulatory measures set out in the WTO agreements is that 
they ought to be the least trade-restrictive means for achieving a legitimate objective. This 
implies that a dispute panel can recommend an alternative to an existing regulation if the 
alternative is “significantly less trade-distorting” and “technically and economically feasible.” 
For example, suppose trade of a product is prohibited because imports under certain regulations  
                                                 
3 For a neutral policy attitude to risk, this line shows the boundary of positive trade-off of the benefits and risks of 
imports of particular products. A risk-averse attitude would be shown by a steeper curve; risk-loving policy by a 
flatter one.  
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Figure 1.2.  Risk-benefit Trade-offs of Different Regulatory Regimes 




























Adapted from Snape and Orden, 2001  
6   
would have coordinates A in Figure 1.2, and the level of risk or adverse consequences at A is 
judged by the importing country to be too high. An exporting country could argue that an 
alternative regulatory regime reduces the dollar value of adverse consequences of trade to a level 
the importer could accept while allowing some importation to occur (resulting in movement from  
A to C). Conversely, if some trade is allowed because the level of risk at A is judged acceptable 
under certain regulations, a panel could recommend an alternative regime that increases the level 
of trade and its net benefits while maintaining the same level of protection from risk or adverse 
consequences (resulting in a move from A to B). But a WTO panel would not recommend 
adoption of a regulatory option producing higher other net benefits from trade, but involving 
greater risks (resulting in D) if a country deems the level of risk at D higher than it is willing to 
accept. Some countries may unilaterally choose regulations resulting in effects shown by D, but 
decisions involving such trade-offs of benefits versus risk or adverse consequences are reserved 
to governments by the national sovereignty principle reiterated throughout the WTO agreements.   
 
Agricultural Product Attribute Dispute Cases  
 
The eighteen disputes related to regulations affecting attributes of agricultural products 
that have been raised in the WTO during 1995-2000 are shown in Table 1.1. These cases suggest 
that the early WTO rulings, and the demonstration effects of these rulings, have made a 
contribution to the integrity of the world trading system, despite the limited trade-opening 
mandate of the agreements on product attributes. The first three agricultural cases to reach the 
Appellate Body under these agreements involved SPS disputes over products whose coordinates 
were found to lie exactly on the vertical axis of Figure 1.2; that is, they were found to have no 
rationale in terms of risk aversion. The measures of concern in each of these cases were imposed 
by developed countries: the EU in the Hormones case, Australia in the Salmon case, and Japan in 
the Varietal Testing case. Hence, the dispute cases have shown that the measures of countries 
with advanced scientific establishments are not immune to challenge. Another 15 product 
attribute cases and negotiated settlements under the agreements have also been reported. The 
outcomes of these 18 cases have dispelled any doubt that the WTO agreements create substantial 
disincentives for the adoption of illegitimate product attribute regulations. Accomplishments 
under the specific product attribute agreements are reviewed in more detail in the sections of this 
paper that follow. But a preliminary evaluation of the agreements ought to first recognize that an 
avalanche of undisciplined regulations hasn’t occurred since the end of the last round; the 
intended deterrence effect of the Uruguay Round rules must be judged a success. 
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Table 1.1. Disputes on Regulations Affecting Attributes of Agricultural Products, 1995 - 2000  
 
 
Case Number (s) 
 
Issue 









DS 3/41  Korea—produce inspection  GATT, SPS, TBT, AoA  United States  Pending 
DS 5  Korea—shelf-life requirements  GATT, SPS, TBT, AoA  United States  Settled 
DS7/12/14  EC—trade description of scallops  GATT, TBT  Canada, Peru, Chile  Settled 
DS 18/21  Australia—ban  on salmon imports  SPS  Canada 
(EC, India, Norway, US) 
Panel and Appellate Body 
ruled against Australia 
DS 20  Korea—bottled water  GATT, SPS, TBT  Canada  Settled 
DS 26/49  EC—ban  on use of hormones  SPS  United States and Canada 
(Australia, New Zealand, Norway) 
Panel and Appellate Body 
ruled against EC 
DS 58/61  US—import prohibition on certain 
shrimp and shrimp products 
GATT, TBT  India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, 
Philippines 
(Australia, Colombia, the EC, 
Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
India, Guatemala, Mexico, Japan, 
Nigeria and Sri Lanka) 
Pending
2  





DS 76  Japan—varietal  testing requirements  SPS  United States 
(Brazil, EC, Hungary) 
Panel and Appellate Body 
ruled against Japan  
DS 96/1  India—quantitative  restrictions in 
imports of agricultural, textile, and 
industrial products 
GATT, AoA, SPS  EC  Settled  
DS 100  US—poultry  requirements  GATT, SPS, TBT  EC  Pending 
DS 133   Slovakia—dairy  product imports and 
transit of cattle (BSE restrictions) 
GATT, SPS, Import 
Licensing  
Switzerland  Pending 
DS 134  EC–- restrictions on rice  GATT, Customs Valuation, 
Import Licensing, TBT, 
SPS, AoA 
India  Pending  
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Table 1.1. Disputes on Regulations Affecting Attributes of Agricultural Products, 1995 – 2000, continued  
 
 
Case Number (s) 
 
Issue 








DS 137   EC—measures on pine wood 
nematodes in conifer wood 
GATT, SPS, TBT  Canada  Pending 
DS 144  US—state  restrictions on Canadian  
trucks 
SPS, TBT, AoA, GATT  Canada  Pending 
DS 174  EC--protection of trademarks and 
geographical indications for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs 
TRIPS  United States  Pending 
DS 203  Mexico—measures affecting trade in 
live swine 
SPS,  AoA, TBT,GATT  United States  Pending 
DS 205  Egypt—import prohibition on canned 
tuna with GM soyoil  
GATT, SPS  Thailand  Pending 
 
 
1 The listed agreements are those indicated in the request for formal consultations, except in the three cases which have been heard by WTO Panels and the 
Appellate Body. In these cases only the agreements used by the WTO to judge the disputed measure are cited.  
 
2 The Panel and Appellate Body ruled against the United States in November, 1998; the United States notified its regulatory changes to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) in January 2000. Malaysia did not view the changes as bringing U.S. measures into compliance with the DSB’s recommendations and 
rulings. In October 2000, the DSB referred the matter back to the original panel at Malaysia’s request. Australia, Canada, the EC, Ecuador, India, Japan, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Thailand and Hong Kong, China reserved their third-party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.  
 
Source: WTO (http:/www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin).  
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Despite the accomplishments in disciplining product attribute regulations under the WTO 
agreements, there remain substantial complaints related to the slow pace of policy reform and the 
regulatory regimes that are being adopted by some countries. In particular, exporters continue to be 
concerned about the number of regimes that block trade even if the level of risk/adverse consequences is 
almost nil.
4 Developing countries often lack the resources to persuade their trading partners to consider 
imports of products perceived to fit into this category and therefore have been sceptical about the benefits 
provided by the agreements. 
 
Proposals in the Agriculture Negotiations 
 
Nineteen negotiating proposals sponsored by seventy-four countries have addressed 
issues related to multilateral rules for product attribute regulation in the first phase of the 
agriculture negotiations that ended on March 27, 2001. These proposals are summarized in Table 
1.2. The proposed modifications have generally been introduced under “non-trade concerns” or 
“market access” which are both referenced in Article 20 (Continuation of the Reform Process) of 
the Agreement on Agriculture.  
 
Member countries have recommended taking up four broad issues in their proposals: (1) 
accommodation of consumer concerns related to food safety, animal welfare, culture, ethics, and 
the environment; (2) geographical indicators and product labeling; (3) regulation of GMOs; and 
(4) developing countries’ rights and obligations under the WTO agreements. Thirty-six 
comments on these proposals round out the WTO debate in the agriculture negotiations to date. 
The proposals and comments set out positions on both modalities and substance. This leaves 
scope for countries to agree on one but not the other, as when countries with the same position 
on geographic indicators disagree over whether the issue should be taken up in the Agreement on 
Agriculture or the TRIPS Council, or when countries with different views on GMO labeling 
agree that the subject should be taken up in the agriculture talks.  
                                                 
4 To cite but one recent example, one country decided to maintain a ban on imports of bone-in poultry cuts from the 
United States based on an assessment that shipments posed a risk of three disease introductions in backyard flocks 
per 100 importation years. Such decisions may be scientifically justifiable, but likely are not economically 
justifiable.  
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Table 1.2. Proposals Related to Product Attribute Regulation in the Agricultural Negotiations 
 
Country  Proposals, notes, and discussion papers  Comments 
Mexico 
W/138 
SPS measures should only be addressed under the SPS Agreement   
Kenya 
W/136 
All exported products must comply with international standards or with 
the national requirements of the exporting country to prevent dumping of 
substandard product in countries without national standards; arbitrary 
imposition of SPS measures by developed countries have hampered 
market access opportunities for Kenya  
 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
W/136 
Developing countries should receive technical and financial assistance 




Members should apply a unified set of international measures that are 
reflective of the specific constraints of developing countries to eliminate 




Developed countries should consider ways to modify current uses of SPS 





Developed countries should not be allowed to use SPS measures for 
protectionist purposes by prescribing overly stringent trade restrictive 




WTO policy reform must be undertaken in ways consistent with other 
relevant multilateral commitments, such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, and accommodate non-trade concerns such as the environment 




The negotiations must deal with non-tariff measures so that unjustified 




GMOs must be addressed because of increasing consumer concerns over 
food safety, health, environment, and biotechnology.  The need for 
precautionary measures to protect human health and the environment as 
well as consumers’ increasing demand for informed choice should be 
dealt with in the negotiation 
 






Developing countries should: have access to appropriate technology to 
meet increasingly stringent SPS requirements; receive assistance so they 
can participate in standard setting bodies; and should be exempt from 
requirements for a detailed risk assessment when refusing entry of 
products which threaten biodiversity.  Geographical indications should 
also be extended to a wider range of agricultural products 
Hungary states that, even if the issue of GIs is not directly 
addressed in the current  negotiations on agriculture, 
developments in GI negotiations occurring elsewhere will affect 
the outcome of the next agreement on agriculture (W/132); 
Sri Lanka supports the proposal by Mauritius to extend the 
coverage of Gis to other agricultural products (W124) 
 
 1 SIDS includes Dominica, Jamaica, Mauritius, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.  
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Table 1.2. Proposals Related to Product Attribute Regulation in the Agricultural Negotiations, continued 
 
Country  Proposals, notes, and discussion papers  Comments 
Switzerland 
W/94 
Negotiation on the  “three pillars” must occur after agreement has been 
reached on appropriate instruments to accommodate consumers’ interests 
which are currently under debate in other WTO bodies (e.g., the TRIPS 
Council) and other international organizations (e.g., the Convention on 
Biological Diversity).  These issues include:  extension of geographical 
indications to products other than wine and spirits; labeling as a means of 
informing consumers, inter alia, about production methods (including 
GMOs), food safety (including the precautionary principle), and 
measures to promote animal welfare  
  
 
Bulgaria supports extending the protection of GIs to other 
products (W/111); 
Hungary tentatively supports examination of modalities 
governing the application of the precautionary principle, and 
seeks a pragmatic approach to the de facto link between the 
market access negotiations and the issue of geographical 
indications.  (W/132); 
Mauritius endorses the importance of GI negotiations in the 
TRIP Council (W/119); 
Slovenia states that progress in other WTO bodies on the issues 
identified by Switzerland is a precondition for the agriculture 
negotiations (W/123) 
India supports Bulgaria and Switzerland’s position that GIs 




A review should be conducted to examine whether the existing 
agreements are sufficient to respond to new issues that have emerged 
since the UR agreements, including GMOs; improving food safety 
should be examined; labeling of all foods so as to protect consumers 
should be undertaken, including the labeling of GMOs; appropriate 
international rules for the labeling of GMOs should be established by 
Codex 
Indonesia states that GMO labeling should not be restricted by 
WTO rules (W/115);  
Thailand states that food safety and consumer concerns should 
be discussed under the SPS and TBT agreements rather than 
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Table 1.2. Proposals Related to Product Attribute Regulation in the Agricultural Negotiations, continued 
 
Country  Proposals, notes, and discussion papers  Comments 
European Union 
W/90 
The negotiations should: clarify the application of the precautionary 
principles; ensure that labeling schemes are appropriately covered by the 
WTO; and ensure that trade liberalization does not undermine efforts to 
improve the protection of the welfare of animals 
Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia state that the 
EU’s ideas on non-trade concerns should be seriously 
considered (W/131); 
Australia does not accept the linkage of these issues to the 
outcome in the agriculture negotiations (W/109); 
India states that other fora are more appropriate for discussion 
of the precautionary principle and some other issues identified 
by the EU, and that such issues should not dilute the focus on 
the core issues of the agriculture negotiations (W/114); 
Malaysia states that market access negotiations should not be 
clouded by the issues of GIs and labeling (W/118); 
Mauritius, as a net food-importing country, believe that states 
that issues related to food safety, including the precautionary 
principle and participation in international standards setting 
bodies, are important (W119) 
Poland strongly supports inclusion of  food safety, consumers’ 
concerns and animal welfare in the negotiations (W/128)   
Thailand states that GIs, labeling, and food safety  are not 
within the scope of the AoA (W/126) 
Sri Lanka supports the EU’s proposal on GIs (W/124) 
Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Kenya, 
India, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe, 
and Haiti (W37) 
SPS measures continue to block market access; failure to recognize 
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Table 1.2. Proposals Related to Product Attribute Regulation in the Agricultural Negotiations, continued 
 
Country  Proposals, notes, and discussion papers  Comments 
Barbados, Burundi, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Dominica, Estonia, EC, Fiji, 
Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malta, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, Saint Lucia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland 
and Trinidad and Tobago 
 (W/36) 
WTO policy reform must account for consumer 
concerns, thereby linking food production to cultural 




To ensure that trade does not undermine efforts to 
improve the protection of animal welfare 
Argentina questions the inconsistencies in the EU’s proposed 
animal welfare provisions; rejects any efforts to include support 
for animal welfare in the blue box; and proposes that this issue 
be taken up in other international fora (W39) 
Paraguay states that the agricultural negotiations are not the 




To safeguard food specificity and fair competition, the 
EU seeks: to prevent the usurpation of names of food 
and beverages;  to ensure that producers are not 
prevented from the rightful use of denominations; and 
to establish labeling rules which protect consumers 
against deception 
Argentina notes that consumers’ interests would best be 
promoted by immediate elimination of export subsidies, price 
subsidies, and tariffs (W/39) 
Australia states that the EU proposal for additional rules to 
safeguard “food specificity” overlook existing WTO rules and 
create the risk of limiting legitimate competition and freedom of 
choice (W/41) 
Colombia states that it regards the EU’s proposal as 
protectionist and that animal welfare issues fall outside the 
scope of the agriculture negotiations (W19) 
Hungary states that issues related to food quality such as GIs 
must be addressed to ensure a fair and equitable outcome of the 
agricultural negotiations (W51) 




Disciplines should be focused to ensure the processes 
covering trade in products developed through new 
technologies are transparent, predictable, and timely 
 
 
2 Comments from the United States which support or oppose the proposals by other members have not been submitted in writing to the WTO  Secretariat. 
 
Source: WTO documents in the G/AG/NG/ series. 
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The proposals that have drawn the most comment are those by the EU, Switzerland, 
Norway, Japan, and a coalition of twenty-seven countries. These proposals advocate measures 
that extend beyond labeling to address food safety and other consumer concerns. The EU’s 
proposals advance the most specific policy objectives: to seek clarification of the application of 
the precautionary principle and to ensure that trade liberalization does not undermine efforts to 
improve animal welfare. The other proposals demand that WTO policy must account for 
consumers’ interests, including cultural, ethical, environmental, and non-safety concerns in more 
general terms. These proposals have been tentatively endorsed by Hungary and fully supported 
by Mauritius, Slovenia, Poland, and a coalition of fourteen Eastern European and FSU countries. 
Four developing countries (India, Thailand, Malaysia, and Paraguay) oppose these initiatives, 
stating that discussions related to these issues are not appropriate for the agriculture negotiations. 
Three other countries expressed their opposition in stronger language: Australia states that it 
does not accept the linkage of these issues to the outcome of the agriculture negotiations; 
Colombia states that it regards the EU’s proposal as protectionist, and Argentina states that it 
firmly rejects these proposals, adding that consumers’ interests would be best promoted by 
immediate elimination of export subsidies, price subsidies, and tariffs. 
 
Geographical indicators and labels that signal other attributes are primarily of interest to 
European countries, but have received support from developing countries as well. Advocacy of 
the extension of geographical indicators to products other than wine and spirits by the European 
Union and Switzerland has long been anticipated. Five countries (Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Bulgaria, 
India, and Hungary) support the objectives of these proposals, but have varying ideas about how 
to achieve them. Recognition of the legitimacy of mandatory labeling for credence attributes 
related to animal welfare, the environment, and other consumers concerns was also advanced as 
an objective of the negotiations by the EU, Switzerland, and Japan. 
 
Four proposals (by the United States, Japan, Korea, and Switzerland) have suggested 
following up on pre-Seattle initiatives by the United States and Canada to discuss different 
dimensions of GMO regulation. The U.S. proposal avoids explicit reference to GMOs, but the 
statement that “[d]isciplines should be focused to ensure the processes covering trade in products 
developed through new technologies are transparent, predictable and timely” is widely 
interpreted to include GMOs as one of the “new technologies” of interest. Switzerland’s interests 
in GMOs extend only to labeling: it proposes that negotiations on the “three pillars” of the 
Agreement on Agriculture occur only after the legitimacy of mandatory GMO labeling as well as 
other consumer issues are agreed. Japan and Korea (with Indonesia’s concurrence) urge broader 
discussion of issues related to GMO regulation, but also endorse rules that allow governments to 
require labeling of GMOs. 
 
More proposals have been submitted on the issue of developing countries and the SPS 
Agreement than any other product attribute topic. These proposals have been submitted by the 
developing countries themselves, including Mexico, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Nigeria, Turkey, India, Mauritius, twelve CARICOM countries, twelve developing countries 
from Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, and seven Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS). Mexico is alone in proposing that SPS measures be addressed solely under the SPS 
Agreement; all other submissions propose to take up issues related to developing countries’ 
rights and obligations under the SPS Agreement within the current negotiations. Many proposals  
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urge facilitation of developing countries’ access to developed country markets by various means, 
such as the adoption of international standards that reflect the constraints of developing countries 
(India) or mandatory technical assistance (Mauritius). Other proposals request assistance with 
import regulations: the SIDS propose flexibility on the obligation to base import measures on 
scientific risk assessments, the Democratic Republic of Congo asks for technical and financial 
assistance, and Kenya suggests provisions to prevent “dumping” of inferior goods into markets 
where no standards currently exist. Similar demands are being tabled in ongoing negotiations in 
the WTO General Council over “Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.”
5 
 
Organization of the Paper  
 
The organization of this paper is suggested by the Uruguay Round legal infrastructure 
and the content of the proposals that have been tabled in the ongoing agriculture negotiations. 
During the Uruguay Round, technical measures that regulated certain enumerated risks related to 
agricultural products were carved out of the TBT Agreement and disciplines to govern their use 
were developed in the SPS Agreement. The second section of this paper reviews the principles 
and mechanisms in this new agreement, weighs the impact it has had on the world trading 
system, and examines whether initiatives set out in submissions will compromise or improve its 
effectiveness. The analysis indicates that although there is a consensus around the fundamental 
requirement of the agreement that SPS measures be based on scientific risk assessments, there 
are varying views on other risk management principles—in short, about how much latitude is 
implied by the words “based on?”  Differences over the appropriate role for the precautionary 
principle and “other legitimate factors” in regulatory decision making are at the root of 
prominent disagreements between powerful trading partners, and progress in reconciling these 
differences is likely to condition progress in other areas of the negotiations. The proposal is made 
that the whole attributes/trade debate could constructively be turned to focus expanded trade as a 
resource efficient means to achieve desired product attributes. At a minimum, countries 
establishing product standards that their trade partners might challenge could expand market 
access for imported products that meet those standards. 
 
  The third section of the paper turns to the TBT and TRIPS Agreements which set forth 
rules for measures that regulate other quality attributes, including regulations for the use of 
labeling (TBT) and geographical indicators (TRIPS). For food products, measures in this area 
may be based on diverse objectives, including facilitating marketing by lowering transaction 
costs, preventing deception, or supporting consumers’ “right to know” about a product and how 
it was produced. From a trade and economic perspective, the issue is identifying policies that 
achieve legitimate objectives in a manner that is least trade restrictive. Finding solutions can be 
complicated by the fact that producers and consumers can simultaneously benefit from standards 
and labeling. Controversies arise most often when much of the benefit is judged to accrue to 
producers in one country at the expense of producers in the other. This section reviews the 
balancing consumer and producer interests in the home and foreign countries in WTO disputes to 
                                                 
5 The WTO initiated implementation negotiations to address the needs of developing countries in May 2000 after the 
Seattle Ministerial failed to launch a new round of trade negotiations. Developing countries have made several 
demands related to the SPS, TBT, and TRIPS Agreements during the course of these ongoing negotiations. Some 
issues have been resolved, but a number are outstanding (“General Council --  Implementation-Related Issues and 
Concerns – Decision of 15 December, 2000,” WT/L/384).        
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date. Obstacles to and options for resolving the issues raised in various country proposals within 
the current negotiations are identified. 
 
  Issues in the regulation of genetically modified products, a watershed event in 
agricultural production technology, are discussed in the fourth section of the paper. The 
heterogeneous approaches to regulating GM foods provide a prism on the challenges to the 
multilateral trading system faced under the Uruguay Round agreements. For example, the 
precautionary principle has been invoked to justify lengthier time periods for regulatory 
approvals of GM imports, and consumer concerns have spawned mandatory labeling regimes for 
GM foods, prompting some manufacturers to seek out conventional commodities in international 
markets. The resulting disagreements over these policy regimes between developed countries in 
the new and old world have received the most attention, but tensions are also evident between 
traditional trade allies, regional trading partners, and even developing countries (the first formal 
complaint to reach the WTO over GM foods was lodged by an Asian exporter against an African 
importer). The outcome of negotiations over issues related to GM regulation may not only have 
implications for the predictability and stability in access to markets for future products of novel 
technologies, but may also have more immediate impact on other systemic issues before the 
WTO, such as labeling production and processing methods for food products.  
 
  The number of proposals and statements by developing countries that identify quarantine 
measures and product attribute regulations as significant impediments to market access 
opportunities is especially important in light of the fact that the WTO has placed high priority on 
the integration of these members into the world economy. The fifth section of this paper reviews 
the evidence regarding the incidence and impact of product attribute trade barriers, and evaluates 
the effects of the new disciplines specified in the Uruguay Round agreements, as well as the 
traditional GATT mechanisms of special and differential treatment and technical assistance. 
Beyond the question of whether the WTO agreements have provided effective solutions is the 
charge that the agreements are part of the problem. It has been argued that the new obligations 
under the agreements (related to requirements for risk assessments, for example) have diverted 
scarce resources from investments needed to capitalize on the trade opportunities created by the 
agreements. This section evaluates available policy options to address these concerns. 
 
   The paper ends with a summary of the above analysis, and conclusions about the 
potential for changes in WTO rules on product attribute regulations that further the objective of 
increased welfare-enhancing trade.  
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Regulation of Safety Attributes: The SPS Agreement 
 
 
The SPS Agreement was concluded in 1994 at the end of the Uruguay Round, and has 
been in force since January 1995. It addresses the application of regulations that protect human, 
animal, and plant health.
6  The principles in the SPS Agreement are designed to ensure that such 
regulations do not unnecessarily hinder or distort trade. This agreement has been extensively 
analyzed elsewhere (e.g. WTOa; Roberts 1998). 
 
Under the SPS Agreement, WTO members support the following principles:  
 
•  Transparency: Member nations are required to publish their regulations and provide a 
mechanism for answering questions from trading partners.  
 
•  Equivalence: Member nations must accept that SPS measures of another country are 
equivalent if they result in the same level of public-health protection, even if the measures 
themselves differ. The same level of health protection should apply to both domestic and 
imported products.  
 
•  Science-based measures: SPS measures must be based upon risk assessment and must be 
chosen so as to minimize distortions to trade. Countries may adopt a provisional measure to 
avoid risk, but must seek information and carry out a risk assessment to justify permanent use 
of a trade-reducing measure. 
 
•  Regionalization: The concept of pest- or disease-free areas within an exporting country is 
recognized. Exports can be allowed from such areas, even if other areas of an exporting 
country still have the disease or pest. 
 
•  Harmonization: Member nations recognize the desirability of common SPS measures. Three 
international organizations are recognized as sources of internationally agreed-upon 
standards: the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), the International Office of 
Epizootics (OIE), and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC).  
 
•  National sovereignty: Countries may choose a risk standard that differs from the international 
standard. This recognizes that individual nations are unwilling to subscribe to uniform 
international standards for all hazards. 
 
In addition to the above principles, the SPS Agreement establishes enforcement mechanisms. 
These mechanisms include notification procedures for informing other WTO members of 
changes in SPS standards; the establishment of an SPS committee to discuss these issues on a 
continuing basis; and the use of WTO dispute resolution mechanisms for resolving conflicts 
between countries in a timely manner.  
                                                 
6 Sanitary refers to human and animal health measures; phytosanitary refers only to plant health.   
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Motivation for the SPS Agreement 
 
SPS measures are adopted to address market failures that result in less than optimal levels 
of human, animal, and plant health. It is important to distinguish two kinds of market failure. The 
first arises in production, when control of an animal or plant health hazard cannot be 
accomplished by individual producer efforts. For example, destroying a diseased animal in one 
herd has positive externalities for other herds that will not be captured without public 
intervention to encourage eradication. Therefore, public monitoring and control may be required 
to capture the public good of improved production capacity resulting from reduced hazards to 
animal and plant health. This kind of control should reduce producer costs in the country 
adopting such measures, and is frequently supported by domestic agricultural producers. 
Recently, such control measures have also been used for environmental goals (e.g. prevention of 
invasive species that will alter a local ecosystem). 
 
The second kind of market failure arises in food safety, when imperfect information 
prevents consumers from paying for desired levels of safety and/or producers from supplying 
improved safety. Public intervention is justified when a food safety standard or regulation 
improves consumer welfare more than it increases industry costs. Food safety measures are 
frequently supported by domestic consumers in an importing country. Thus, both the economic 
welfare analysis and the political economy associated with these two kinds of market failure 
differ.  
 
SPS measures by their nature either increase the costs of trade or prevent trade entirely. 
They increase production costs for exporters if they must meet a different or higher SPS standard 
in international markets; they increase costs of monitoring at the border for importing countries; 
and they can increase the transactions costs of international trade when standards differ among 
countries.  
 
The negotiations leading up to the SPS Agreement were motivated by exporter concerns 
about the arbitrary use of SPS measures by importers (G/SPS/GEN/209). There is also 
substantial evidence that SPS disputes are becoming more important over time due to several 
trends. Reduction in traditional trade barriers, growth in trade of fresh and minimally processed 
foods, growth in trade of livestock products, and increased consumer awareness and demand for 
safety have all contributed to increased disputes over SPS measures and allegations that they 
pose barriers to trade (Unnevehr 2000; Henson and Loader 1999; Buzby and Roberts 1997; Dyck 
and Nelson 2000). 
 
Thus, the SPS Agreement must balance two potentially competing goals. The first is to 
recognize the legitimate economic and social need for countries to adopt SPS measures. The 
second is to set a framework in place to reduce the trade distorting aspects of SPS regulations. 
Reduction of trade distortions have the potential to increase welfare from trade in the usual ways, 
but might also improve human, animal, and plant health by allowing greater specialization in the 
production of “safety.”  In other words, trade might make possible food production with 
particular safety and health attributes in countries and regions where such attributes are 
comparatively easy to produce. Trade may also make it easier to meet differing demands for 
safety and health attributes among consumers within the same country. Thus, the SPS Agreement  
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can be evaluated both for whether it has reduced distortions due to SPS measures and for 
whether it has enhanced the ability of trade to meet consumer demand for safety and health.  
 
SPS Measures and Their Consequences 
 
  Three general kinds of policy instruments are used to achieve SPS protection:  import 
bans, technical specifications, and information remedies  (Roberts et al 1999). Import bans may 
be either total or partial (e.g. no imports of certain meat cuts from a particular species). These are 
most likely to be used to protect animal and plant health by preventing the introduction of 
diseases or pests. A well-known example is the ban on beef imports into the U.S. from countries 
that have foot and mouth disease (FMD) endemic in cattle. The economic issue in evaluating 
such bans is weighing the cost of the ban versus the benefits of trade and the cost of managing a 
disease or pest if established. The literature shows that this varies on a case-by-case basis. There 
are examples of import bans that reduce total welfare, because the cost of disease establishment 
is easily outweighed by the benefits from imports (Glauber and Narrod 2000; James and 
Anderson 1998; Orden and Romano 1996). On the other hand, there are cases where the import 
ban is less costly than disease establishment, because the domestic industry can provide supply at 
lower cost with the ban than imports could without the ban or because the country would lose 
potential export markets (Jetter, Sumner, and Civeraolo 2000; Ekboir 1999; Fuller et al 1997). 
Thus, while this might be the most harmful measure to international trade, it is not necessarily 
welfare-reducing for the importing country.
7 
 
  The second category of SPS measures, technical specifications, includes process and 
product standards. These are applied in animal and plant health as standards that must be met to 
ensure that diseases are not introduced (e.g. specified fumigation procedures for plant imports). 
These kinds of standards are also the most often used in meeting the objective of food safety. 
Examples include requirements regarding somatic cell counts in fresh milk, use of refrigeration 
and other process controls in seafood processing, or standards for pesticide residues in foods. Of 
the 74 “specific trade concerns” brought to the attention of the SPS committee by WTO 
members during the first six years of the agreement, most address process standards, and they are 
about equally divided between animal/plant health and food safety measures (G/SPS/GEN/204). 
 
In evaluating food safety interventions, domestic regulators evaluate product and process 
standards by weighing the value of presumed health benefits to consumers (reduced costs of 
illness, reduced risk of illness) against the costs to producers of meeting the standard. Unlike 
animal and plant health measures, this kind of analysis compares non-market benefits with 
market costs. A further complication is the role of risk perception in determining consumer 
benefits. Unnatural, involuntary, unfamiliar risks are more alarming to consumers than natural, 
voluntary, and familiar risks (Kunreuther and Slovic 1996). Thus, the political process may result 
                                                 
7 Sometimes the welfare gains are a regional issue involving several countries. For example, regional animal disease 
control is necessary where animals move freely across borders (e.g. southern Africa). An interesting area for future 
research is examination of whether global control of pests and diseases would raise global welfare, and the 
distribution of the gains (and losses). Such research might lead to the design of trade and welfare-enhancing controls 
(and compensations) that might be more economically rational than national-level controls.   
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in standards that are more protective for certain kinds of risks (e.g. pesticide residues) than for 
others (e.g. microbial pathogens).
8  
 
Differences in risk perceptions, available market information, the incidence of risks in 
production, and traditional methods of food processing and preparation all lead to differences in 
food safety outcomes among countries. Thus, a food safety standard may improve welfare in one 
country, but not necessarily elsewhere; this explains frequently observed differences in standards 
among countries. 
 
Determining equivalence of risk outcomes between different standards is also difficult. 
Economic theory favors product over process standards, as the former allow firms to meet a 
standard in the least cost manner. However, in practice, process standards are frequently 
specified due to the difficulties of measuring outcomes, particularly for microbial pathogens 
(Unnevehr and Jensen 2000). Determining equivalence in risk outcomes can be challenging in 
such cases. At a minimum, it may raise monitoring costs to determine that complex process 
standards are followed in the exporting country (e.g. FSIS inspection of individual meat 
processing plants in exporting countries). Further difficulties will arise when production 
practices and the incidence of risks vary widely across countries, making it difficult to determine 
if a process standard will lead to an equivalent risk outcome (Hathaway 1995). Thus, food safety 
standards, especially process standards, are likely to be contentious and difficult to harmonize in 
international trade. 
 
The third type of policy instrument is the use of information remedies to address market 
failure directly, particularly for food safety. These include required labeling regarding potential 
risks or controls on voluntary health claims. Information remedies can enhance welfare by 
addressing a market failure directly and allowing market forces to determine the appropriate 
level of safety to be supplied. These approaches are particularly favored when a small 
subpopulation faces considerable risk (e.g. allergies) and imposition of a market-wide standard 
would reduce welfare for the average consumer. Where risks occur for all consumers, 
information approaches may be used along with standards. This affords consumers both 
protection and greater choice (e.g. reduced pathogens in hamburger plus safe handling labels). 
The impact of information policies on international trade is discussed more fully in the TBT 
section of this commissioned paper. 
 
To sum up, market failures lead governments to use SPS policy instruments. Because the 
nature of these market failures varies widely, individual countries can experience enhanced 
economic welfare from the imposition of measures to address SPS hazards, even when such 
measures severely hinder trade. Furthermore, an unconstrained choice of standards would be 
unlikely to lead to harmonization of standards among countries. The economic welfare 
implications of animal and plant health measures are largely measured in terms of conventional 
consumer and producer surplus, so that evaluation of the trade-offs between trade and reduced 
risk is relatively straightforward. These kinds of disputes are more likely to be resolved at the 
technical level. However, food safety measures raise tradeoffs of human health risk against 
potential changes in conventional consumer and producer surplus. Problems of valuing life, 
                                                 
8 More protective may mean either the application of a higher risk standard (fewer lives or illnesses permitted by the 
standard); or it may mean that a lower benefit/cost ratio brings about government intervention.   
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health, and attendant risks make economic analysis of food safety standards and comparisons 
among countries more difficult. In light of these potential barriers to international trade, the 
progress achieved under the SPS Agreement is impressive. 
 
Enhancement of Trade Under the SPS Agreement  
 
  There is evidence that the SPS Agreement has improved transparency, encouraged 
greater use of risk assessment as a basis for regulation, and encouraged animal disease control 
measures. In the area of transparency, the majority of WTO member countries have established 
enquiry points for SPS matters. There has been extensive use made of the notification system for 
informing trading partners about new measures and for countries to respond with questions about 
new measures (Roberts et al in press). The latter includes “cross-notification,” to air a grievance 
over a specific measure, and “co-complaints” by other exporters to support a grievance. Roberts 
et al report that these exchanges have provided a forum for airing disagreements and have 
promoted symmetry of information among WTO members. In one case, a proposed change in 
natural toxin residue levels, the EU was persuaded by protests from developing countries to 
reconsider the regulation for aflatoxin in peanuts. There is also limited evidence that greater use 
is being made of risk assessment to provide a scientific basis for reviewing and revising SPS 
measures. Roberts et al cite changes in Japanese and U.S. regulations, including lifting the 83-
year-old US ban on imports of Mexican avocados.   
 
The regionalization provision of the SPS Agreement has enhanced trade. It may have 
spurred efforts to eradicate FMD in the southern cones countries of South America (Marshall et 
al 2000). By ensuring that partial eradication would lead to trade gains, the SPS Agreement 
provided the motivation for greater investment in control measures. Regional responses to pest 
outbreaks reduce the impact of quarantines, such as that imposed against poultry from California 
(rather than the entire US) following an outbreak of Newcastle disease (Orden et al 2000). 
 
  There has been less progress under the SPS Agreement in the areas of equivalence and 
harmonization. For the reasons discussed above, it is difficult for countries to determine 
equivalence. One exception is the veterinary agreement of 1999 between the EU and the US, 
which provides mutual recognition of sanitary measures for meat, fish, dairy, and poultry 
products (Roberts et al in press). Harmonization is fostered through the establishment of 
internationally recognized standards under three international organizations:  the Codex, IPPC, 
and OIE. Participation in these three organizations has expanded since the SPS Agreement came 
into effect, and they also provide a forum for sharing information. However, for many specific 
measures there are no international standards or countries choose to use a stricter standard. The 
IPPC and the OIE often describe only guidelines or approaches for setting standards, recognizing 
the differences in animal and plant health risks among countries.  
 
The Uruguay Round agreements have provided a framework for dispute settlement. 
Formal complaints related to the SPS Agreement have been brought to the WTO in 14 cases (see 
Table 1.1).  So far, only three disputes have reached a panel ruling and the Appellate Body; 
others are in negotiation or resolved. In the first dispute (which predated the SPS Agreement), 
the US and Canada challenged the science basis for the EU ban on growth hormones in beef 
production. In the second case, the US challenged Japanese testing requirements regarding  
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treatment effectiveness for new varieties of selected horticultural products. In the third case, 
Canada challenged Australia’s ban on salmon imports to prevent the spread of fish diseases. In 
all three cases, the panel and Appellate Body ruled for the complainants (exporters) on at least 
some grounds. All three cases provide lessons regarding the use of science as a basis for SPS 
measures. In particular, the dispute rulings show how different articles of the SPS Agreement can 
be used to evaluate the science basis for a measure, as summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
In the salmon disease case, the scientific basis of the ban (Articles 2.2 and 5.1) and 
inconsistency in use of science (Articles 2.3 and 5.5) were the principle issues examined. The 
WTO panel (and subsequently the Appellate Body) concluded that Australia’s scientific report 
used to justify the measures at issue was not a risk assessment because it did not evaluate the 
likelihood that disease would enter or spread, or the potential consequences of the diseases. The 
WTO also concurred with Canada that the salmon import ban provided a level of environmental 
protection arbitrarily higher than that provided by other Australian sanitary measures, because 
Australia allows imports of other fish that are potentially vectors for the same or even more 
virulent diseases (G/SPS/GEN/209).  
 
The ruling against Japan’s data requirement was based on a lack of science, unfair 
application of measures, and non-transparency. The requirement of new data for each new plant 
variety is not supported by science, since there is no evidence that the effect of fumigation 
measures varies with plant variety. Japan’s argument that the measure was provisional was not 
accepted since it had been in place for 48 years (G/SPS/GEN/209). Even if the measure had been 
accepted as provisional, the Japanese requirement for data from an exporter was found not to 
fulfill the obligation under article 5.7 to seek additional information to complete a risk 
assessment. Finally, the WTO found that the measure was not transparent, in violation of Article 
7, as it failed to meet the conditions for publication set out in an annex of the agreement.  
 
In the EU beef hormone case, the Appellate Body ruling affirmed the right of WTO 
members to establish a level of consumer protection higher than the level set by international 
health standards. The ban on hormone treated beef was nonetheless judged to be in violation of 
the SPS Agreement as it was not backed by an objective risk assessment (Article 5.1). The 
Appellate Body concurred with the panel that inconsistent EU policies regarding the use of 
growth promoting substances in animals were “arbitrary and unjustifiable” (the EU allowed the 
use of carbadox, a potentially cancer causing substance, in the more competitive pork sector). 
But the appellate judges overturned the panel’s ruling that the EU’s ban was “a disguised 
restriction on trade,” perhaps in deference to the fact that the ban arose from consumer concerns. 
This indicates the difficulty of dealing with consumer concerns within the current SPS 
framework.   
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Table 2.1.  Decisions in the Three SPS Cases Heard by WTO Panels 
 
  EC – Hormones  Japan – Varietal 
Testing   
Australia – Salmon 
As judged by   
SPS Provision Violated 






Article 2.2:  Measures must be based on scientific 
principles and must not be maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence  
    X  X  X  X 
Article 2.3:  Members must ensure that SPS measures do 
not arbitrarily or unjustifiable discriminate between 
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail  
        X  X 
Article 3.1:  Measures must conform to international 
standards; but countries can adopt measures with a higher 
level of SPS protection than international standards if 
there is a scientific justification (Article 3.3) 
X           
Article 5.1:  Measures must be based on a risk assessment   X  X    X  X  X 
Article 5.5:  Members shall avoid distinctions in levels of 
SPS protection if such distinctions result in discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on trade  
X          X 
Article 5.6:  Measures must be not more trade restrictive 
than required 
    X    X   
Article 5.7:  Members can adopt measures on a 
provisional basis when scientific evidence is insufficient, 
but must seek additional information to conduct a risk 
assessment  
    X  X     
Article 7 and Annex B:  Measures must be transparent       X  X     
1 The original panel, at the request of Canada, reviewed the revised measures adopted by Australia after the Appellate Body’s ruling. The panel judged that the 
revised measures were not in compliance with Australia’s obligations under Articles 2.2, 5.1, and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. It also ruled that Tasmania’s 
continuing ban on Canadian salmon imports was in violation of Articles 2.2 and 5.1. Australia has since revised its measures to Canada’s satisfaction; the 
Tasmanian ban is still in place.  
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To date, only the salmon case has been successfully concluded with changes in the 
importing country’s measures. Japan and the United States are close to settling the varietal 
testing case, but the parties have not yet formally notified the WTO of a mutually acceptable 
solution to the dispute. In the hormones case, the EU has yet to bring its measures into 
compliance with the SPS Agreement. The parties to the dispute could not agree on a product 
labeling regime (which was recommended by the panel), nor could they agree on a compensation 
deal that would leave the EU ban in place but provide trade concessions on other products. The 
WTO General Council therefore authorized retaliation by the complainants (in the form of 
increased tariffs) against $128.1 million of European products.  
 
These dispute rulings set important precedents regarding the consistent application of risk 
standards and measures, the burden of carrying out data collection and risk assessment, the limits 
on adoption of measures on a provisional basis, and transparency. The outcome of the hormones 
dispute also raise some questions about other means of resolving disputes, as will be discussed 
below. The problem that remains for the long run is whether the application of the SPS 
Agreement will bring about new kinds of opposition to trade, if consumer interest groups 
become convinced that differences in consumer valuations of risk among countries are not 
adequately recognized.  
 
Issues, Positions, and Conflicts in the Agriculture Negotiations 
 
  There are four issues that condition any discussion of the SPS Agreement among WTO 
members. These are:   
 
•  The role of science and cost-benefit analysis in determining measures 
 
•  The relationship of SPS measures to the “multifunctionality” of agriculture  
 
•  The role of the precautionary principle in allowing measures when science is uncertain 
 
•  The tension between consumer protection and consumer gains from trade 
 
Two of the most important issues, the disputes over GMOs and the impacts of the SPS 
Agreement on developing countries and, are covered in other sections of this commissioned 
paper.  
 
  Although risk assessment is receiving increased support in pronouncements of 
government food safety agencies, the developed countries differ in their application of this 
methodology to SPS measures. The US, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, are most 
committed to application of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis. The EU and Japan, on the 
other hand, want “other legitimate factors” to be taken into account in setting international 
standards. These might include the special circumstances of small farmers, traditional production 
methods (e.g. soft cheeses), or consumer preferences. Thus, the degree of commitment to science 
as the final arbiter of SPS disputes is far from complete among WTO members. 
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  Related to other legitimate factors is the relationship of SPS issues to the 
multifunctionality of agriculture. The EU Agriculture Commissioner has recently stated the BSE 
(mad cow) crisis demonstrates that agriculture is more than just an industry. As Commissioner 
Fischler put it “European agriculture is also about the environment, consumers and food safety. 
This is why we will stand firm to defend these non-trade concerns in WTO talks.” (quoted in SCI 
Policy Report, Feb 6, 2001)  Support (through trade protection) and regulation of agriculture to 
accomplish non-trade goals are seen as complementary policies in the EU. This linkage is not 
recognized in the SPS Agreement, and the US and Cairns group would argue that non-trade goals 
can be addressed more effectively through measures that do not distort trade. 
 
  Another dimension of the debate about the role of science is the disagreement over use of 
the  precautionary principle. This principle has a long history in European policy 
(G/SPS/GEN/168), particularly with respect to environmental risks. This principle recognizes 
that when science is uncertain and potential harm may be great, it is legitimate to exercise 
precaution. The precautionary principle is recognized implicitly in article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement, which allows countries to put in place provisional measures where “relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient.”  Both the EU and Japan invoked the precautionary principle 
in the beef hormone and plant protection disputes before WTO panels, but this principle was 
rejected as a basis for the disputed measures in the rulings. The EU has invoked the 
precautionary principle in policies regarding GMOs (e.g. the ban on approval of new GMOs in 
early 2000) on the basis that many risks are unknown. There are clearly differences in 
philosophy between the EU and the US. The US is more willing to accept the risks of action 
rather than the risks of inaction (see the subsequent section on GMO regulation). The difficulty is 
that the application of the precautionary principle must always entail some judgment about 
acceptable risks. Any new technology will have unknown risks that cannot be completely ruled 
out by science. Countries will necessarily differ in their judgments, and this can lead to SPS 
disputes that are difficult to resolve. 
 
  Consumer advocacy groups are among those that often support more, rather than less, 
precaution. Their recent appearance in trade debates highlights the potential conflict between 
enacting SPS measures that protect human health and reduction of trade barriers to increase 
consumer welfare. The tension between consumer protection and consumer gains from trade 
make the political economy of these trade barriers different from other barriers to trade. 
Consumers International, a coalition of consumer groups in 120 countries, states that “Sound 
science is necessary for making safety decisions, but they must also take into account non-
scientific factors such as economic concerns, ethical issues, environmental impact, and the 
benefits for the consumer to be obtained from the process or product” (Consumers International 
2000). The consumer advocates often perceive the WTO and the Codex as potentially “captured” 
by industry interests, and would like to ensure representation of consumer protection interests. 
As with other groups lobbying to open up WTO processes, these additional interests may ensure 
more acceptable solutions to trade disputes in the future, but more complex negotiations in the 
short run. 
 
No country has advanced a proposal to reopen the SPS Agreement in the upcoming round 
of agricultural trade negotiations (WTOb). Proposals related to the SPS Agreement were 
summarized in the introduction. They include the EU’s proposal to clarify the application of the  
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precautionary principle; proposals by a group of Eastern Europe and FSU countries that 
consumers interests be accounted for in the WTO reform process; and several proposals from 
less developed countries regarding international SPS standards and technical assistance. These 
proposals show the variety of interests at stake and the way in which the SPS Agreement 
connects with other issues in agricultural trade.    
 
An Option for Conflict Resolution 
 
  Although the SPS Agreement may not be formally reopened in this round of negotiations, 
the potential problem with the SPS Agreement’s long run viability is the difficulty of dealing 
with scientific uncertainty about risk combined with differences in consumer risk perceptions 
and valuations among countries. One potential way to address this concern might be to give 
greater flexibility for countries to set standards but only when allowing greater market access. 
Higher SPS standards tend to correlate with greater protection for agriculture (as both are linked 
to higher incomes). Where consumers place “inconsistent” valuations on risks from different 
sources or perceive unknown risks as more important, countries could retain standards reflecting 
those valuations but only if they agree to give greater market access to exporters who meet the 
standard. An example is the expanded market access for US beef exports to the EU, but on the 
condition that these are certified to be free from administered growth hormones. By expanding 
market access but also providing consumer assurances, such compromises would enhance the 
welfare gains from trade. Such arrangements could also break the perceived link between farm 
income support and stringent SPS measures, which does not contribute to meeting health and 
safety goals in the most economically efficient manner. While the SPS Agreement is still needed 
to define the boundaries of appropriate standards, introducing flexibility for risk perceptions and 
valuations when combined with greater market access would at least advance the goal of 
expanding agricultural trade and reducing overall trade barriers.  
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Regulation of Other Quality Issues:  
The TBT and TRIPS Agreements 
 
 
  The previous section discussed the treatment of safety-related regulation of food under 
the SPS Agreement. This section turns to the WTO’s approach to regulation of non-safety related 
attributes or what we refer to as “other quality attributes.” This language reflects the fact that 
quality is made up of numerous dimensions, with safety being the quality attribute that is 
normally given first importance. Among the other quality attributes are nutrition (e.g. calories, 
fiber, vitamins), sensory characteristics (e.g. color, taste, aroma), value or function characteristics 
(e.g. compositional integrity, size), and process characteristics related to how a product was 
produced (e.g. animal welfare, environmental impact). 
 
  Regulation of other quality attributes, being non-safety related, falls outside the purview 
of the SPS Agreement. The TBT Agreement is the main WTO discipline on this type of 
regulation. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement also is relevant because it has a section dealing 
with geographical indications as a form of intellectual property. These indications are frequently 
used for food products. As elsewhere noted, individual regulations may have multiple purposes 
and can simultaneously fall under more than one of the agreements that affect the regulation of 
food quality. 
 
  The WTO’s treatment of quality regulation for food differs from its treatment of other 
products because the safety concerns are placed under the SPS Agreement. For other products, 
the TBT Agreement covers all forms of quality regulation, including safety. The TBT Agreement 
is concerned with technical regulations (mandatory requirements), standards (voluntary 
guidelines), and conformity assessment systems (e.g. certification) for products. Technical 
regulations and conformity assessment systems related to them are of key importance because of 
their mandatory nature. 
 
As noted, the TRIPS Agreement comes into play for regulation of some food products 
because of its provisions protecting geographical indications. These geographical indications are 
defined within the agreement as “indications that identify a good as originating in the territory of 
a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.” Additional 
protection for geographical indications is afforded to wines and spirits. The Agreement is, 
however, less encompassing than the provisions of the European Communities for protection of 
products with a designation of origin (PDO) or a geographical indication (PGI). Geographical 
indications and many technical regulations of other quality attributes are ultimately expressed as 
information that appears on the product label making labeling a key factor in this area of 
regulation. 
 
  More generally, issues related to other quality attributes also arise under the Agreement 
on Agriculture and the main provisions of the GATT. For example, determining whether a food 
product is part of a quota may require examination of technical regulations that define and  
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distinguish similar products.
9 More fundamentally, many countries wish to ensure that the 
Agreement on Agriculture does not unduly limit their ability to encourage production practices 
that ultimately affect non-safety quality attributes. These production practices may impact food 
safety at the same time. Examples include animal welfare provisions, organic production, and 
other food quality provisions related to region of production or artisanal production practices. 
 
Motivations for Regulation of Other Quality Attributes  
 
There are several major motivations for governments to regulate other quality (non-
safety) attributes, either directly or through labeling or other forms of information provision 
(Golan et al 2000; Caswell 1998; Caswell and Mojduszka 1996). These motivations are based on 
possible information imperfections and public goods in the supply chain and at the consumer 
level. The first motivation is to facilitate production and trade, and lower transaction costs, 
particularly when trading partners are at a distance, through product standards (e.g. a technical 
standard for compatibility) and related information. Information on quality may be lacking or 
efficiencies may be gained from common standards that no individual sellers and buyers would 
see worth their while to establish. Government regulation of this type is frequently in demand by 
industry participants. These policies and related standards may be more a means of excluding 
competition than of attaining marketing efficiencies in some cases, as the scallops case discussed 
below illustrates. 
 
Second, regulation may assure that minimum quality standards are met providing 
protection from fraudulent products to buyers, particularly consumers. Government may also 
regulate in order to assure the truthfulness of information provided in advertising or labeling and 
to facilitate consumer choice by requiring that particular types of information be provided. This 
form of regulation can protect consumers from deception and allow them to more easily find 
products that better meet their needs. Finally, regulation of other quality attributes can serve to 
protect trade names and identifiers so that their owners’ rights are not violated. Whether 
regulations motivated by these arguments enhance welfare depends on the degree of inefficiency 
or deception that would have occurred in their absence, the degree to which the regulation 
corrects the problem, and the extent to which the standards limit the variety of products offered 
in the market (Pick and Zago, in press). 
 
Regulation of other quality attributes involves standards and certification. Labeling plays 
a key role in the operation of many food related technical regulations, standards, and 
geographical indications. Labeling policies themselves have two fundamental characteristics. 
First, as discussed above, they address situations where information is thought to be absent or 
inadequate. For example, nutrition labeling was mandated in the United States because it was 
believed that voluntary labeling was delivering inadequate information to consumers. Second, 
while these policies are often focused on consumer choice, they tend to have effects on the entire 
supply chain. For example, organic certification and labeling standards affect production, 
processing, and distribution practices as they attempt to deliver uniform product quality and 
                                                 
9 For example, New Zealand asked for consultation with the European Communities and a dispute panel was 
established over measures that excluded butter manufactured under certain processes from the definition of butter 
eligible for New Zealand’s country-specific tariff quota (WT/DS72/1). The mutually agreed solution involved the 
EC reclassifying the excluded butter so that it fell within the butter quota.  
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information at the consumer end of the supply chain. Thus labeling programs are themselves 
technical regulations but they also require an entire system of standards and certification, which 
gives rise to further technical regulations. Even standards in the form of voluntary labeling 
schemes frequently require governmental oversight through labeling guidelines that may in 
effect be technical regulations. 
 
Defining the legitimate scope of consumer protection activity by governments remains an 
unresolved and contentious issue in international trade negotiations. The prevention of deception 
is clearly viewed as a legitimate objective of regulation. More recently, the concept of the 
consumer’s right to know has come to the forefront. Although not fully defined, this concept is 
broader in its application than the prevention of deception, although it may be difficult in 
practice to separate the two concepts. The prevention of deception is a negative concept; the 
consumer is protected from receiving false information about the product’s attributes. The 
consumer’s right to know is a positive concept; the consumer is provided with truthful 
information that may be important to his/her purchase decision. For example, a country might 
prevent deception by establishing regulations that require that any product claiming to have been 
produced in a way that enhances animal welfare meet certain standards. Alternatively, the 
country could require that the method of production, and its degree of animal friendliness, be 
declared on the label. The latter policy would support the consumer’s right to know about 
production practices used for particular products. Proponents of the consumer’s right to know 
view it as fundamental objective of regulatory efforts, while opponents view it as a potential 
vehicle for protectionist measures.  
 
Since any regulation of other quality attributes is likely to have multiple motivations and 
impacts, evaluation of the welfare effects of these technical measures is often difficult. The 
increased use of labeling in markets for food products especially requires a careful evaluation of 
its benefits and costs, and its trade impacts. The TBT and TRIPS Agreements attempt to 
establish at least a rough sort between those regulations that are likely to be welfare enhancing 
and those that are very likely not to be. The success of the agreements in achieving this 
distinction is the main criterion for judging their effectiveness. 
 
Disciplines in the TBT Agreement 
  The TBT Agreement articulates a balancing of goals typical of the product attribute 
agreements of the WTO. It recognizes the important contribution that international standards and 
conformity assessment systems can make to improving efficiency in production and facilitating 
trade, and encourages the development and use of such standards. It also seeks to ensure that 
regulations and standards do not create unnecessary barriers to trade; while recognizing a 
country’s right to take measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports,  to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health and the environment, or to prevent  deceptive practices. The overall 
idea is to increase welfare by inhibiting regulations that simply act as a protectionist barrier to 
trade, while allowing those that provide benefits in the absence of significant costs or benefits 
that are greater than the possible costs of the regulation and exclusion of products. The regulation 
of other quality attributes has a significant impact on food products trade. For example, the 
American Frozen Food Institute recently complained about tariffs and quotas that affect exports 
but also about trade-limiting technical regulations such as percentage ingredient labeling (Food 
Chemical News 26/02/01).   
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Technical regulations and standards for non-safety attributes can take any of the forms 
available to safety regulations. These include bans; process, product, or packaging standards; and 
information remedies (e.g. labeling requirements or control of voluntary claims). This is 
indicated by the TBT Agreement’s definition of a technical regulation:  
 
a document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which 
compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process 
or production method. 
 
The agreement explicitly states a preference for technical regulations specified based on product 
requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics, wherever 
appropriate. In other words, it expresses a preference for product standards over standards for 
process and production methods. 
 
  Technical regulations are likely to play an increasing role in international trade in food 
products. Many quality attributes that countries may wish to regulate directly or indirectly 
through regulating how labels communicate about these characteristics are non-safety related or 
have only a secondary safety relationship. Examples include regulation of animal husbandry 
practices (animal welfare), organic production, local or regional production systems aimed at 
rural revitalization, and labeling of GMOs. Labeling is an attractive alternative because 
governments want to encourage or discourage certain practices and they face difficulty justifying 
direct regulation of those practices for imports because of limitations on the scope of purposes 
allowed under the TBT Agreement. Labeling is attractive because when a country is not able to 
impose process standards for imported products, its only alternative may be a labeling regime 
that it hopes will encourage products made using the desired practices. How well the TBT and 
TRIPS Agreements will deal with this expanding domain of technical regulations in order to 
allow their application but limit their effect as trade barriers remains to be seen. 
 
  The TBT Agreement strongly encourages use of international standards where possible. 
As under the SPS Agreement, when a country prepares, adopts, or applies a technical regulation 
for one of the legitimate objectives the agreement recognizes, and it is in accordance with 
relevant international standards, it is rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle 
to international trade. In general, international standards, mostly developed under the auspices of 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, form the basis for the harmonization of technical 
regulations for food products. Product standards and their related conformity assessment systems 
are easier to harmonize than standards for process and production methods. To the extent that 
newer technical regulations focus on process and production standards, harmonization and 
equivalence agreements will be harder to attain. 
 
Dispute Settlement Under the Agreements 
Several requests for consultations, disputes, and mutually agreed solutions have focused 
on alleged violations of the TBT Agreement in regard to regulation of the quality attributes of 
food products. One request for consultation has involved geographical indications under the 
TRIPS Agreement. We will look first at experience under the TBT Agreement.  
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The TBT Agreement sets down several principles for judging the legitimacy of a 
technical regulation. Members must ensure national treatment of like products of domestic and 
international origin; that technical regulations are not more trade-restrictive than necessary to 
fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create; and that 
international standards when they exist are used as a basis for regulation except when they would 
be an ineffective or inappropriate means of fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued. 
Legitimate objectives are, inter alia, national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive 
practices; and protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health or the 
environment. In assessing such risks, the country must consider, inter alia, available scientific 
and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of products. 
 
In general, for food products the TBT Agreement may be characterized as establishing 
less stringent standards for the legitimacy of regulatory actions by countries than does the SPS 
Agreement. First, compared to the SPS Agreement, the list of legitimate objectives is broader 
and less clearly defined. The TBT Agreement’s legitimate objectives include, among other 
things, national security, the prevention of deceptive practices, and any safety issues not within 
the purview of the SPS Agreement related to humans, plants, animals, and the environment. Thus 
the list, while not unlimited, is more inclusive than under the SPS Agreement. In addition, 
particular elements of the list may have fairly broad latitude. For example, prevention of 
deception is a legitimate objective that could lead to extensive technical regulations and labeling 
regimes. 
 
Second, the approach to assessing risks is more broadly defined than in the SPS 
Agreement, or at least when compared to the interpretation of the SPS Agreement in dispute 
decisions to date. It is not clear, for example, what would constitute an acceptable risk analysis 
for the probability of deception and its costs and benefits for mislabeled organic products. 
Similarly to the SPS Agreement, the judgment of whether a technical regulation is least trade 
restrictive will generally be made by comparison to other regulatory approaches that could have 
been chosen but were not. Thus it might be easier for a technical regulation to pass muster under 
the TBT Agreement than a safety regulation to pass under the SPS Agreement. 
 
For food products, several consultations and/or panels on technical regulations have 
resulted in the notification of mutually agreed solutions among the parties to the WTO. A key  
example has involved France’s proposed regulation of the labeling of scallops. France had 
adopted a regulation that would restrict the use of the label terms “coquille Saint-Jacques” and 
“noix de coquille Saint-Jacques” to a specified number of species of the genus pectinidae. Under 
the regulation, species sold by Canada, Peru, and Chile, among others, would be excluded from 
using these labeling terms. The affected exporting countries argued that the alternative trade 
name that would be allowed would link their scallops to a product of lower quality and price in 
the French market, thereby causing economic injury. They further argued that the regulation was 
contrary to traditional trade practice and that the consumer makes no distinction between their 
scallops and scallops that could use the two restricted names because there is no difference in 
terms of size, texture, appearance, or use. 
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A dispute panel was established but before it issued a report the European Communities 
notified the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of a mutually agreed solution to this disagreement. 
France agreed to drop the restriction on the use of the terms but added further labeling 
requirements that: 
 
1.  Scallops must be marketed in France under the name “Saint Jacques” or “noix de 
coquille Saint Jacques” or “noix de Saint Jacques” or any other combination of the 
term Saint Jacques consistent with the nature of the product, followed by the 
scientific name of the species. 
 
2.  The country of origin must be indicated in clearly visible lettering on the same side of 
the label as the name, but not necessarily immediately adjacent thereto. 
 
Two principles of the TBT Agreement are most relevant to this case. First is the 
requirement that imported product be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to 
like products of national origin. If the products were like, then the French regulation as first 
adopted would have violated the requirement of national treatment. Second is the requirement 
that technical regulations not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create. If France’s objective was to 
inform companies and consumers about the species and sources of their scallops, then a less 
trade restrictive approach was available in the form of a regulation requiring that the species and 
country of origin be specified on the label, as finally agreed. The overall message from this 
consultation is that countries will face successful challenges to technical regulations that 
discriminate between like products and that are not least trade restrictive. 
 
No dispute panel reports have involved the application of the TBT Agreement to food 
products. More generally, no dispute panel reports have been decided on the basis of the TBT 
Agreement. The only case to go through the Appellate Body based primarily on the TBT 
Agreement involved Canada’s objection to French measures affecting asbestos and asbestos-
containing products (WT/DS135/AB/R). This case throws only a little light on the interpretation 
of the TBT Agreement for food products because of the separate existence of the SPS Agreement 
covering safety issues for food. The asbestos decision provides guidance for interpretation of 
what are like products, what it means to not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a 
legitimate objective, and the extent to which countries must consider or adopt international 
standards in their rule making. The complaint against the United States by India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and Thailand regarding its import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products is 
of interest here too. Because this dispute (WT/DS/58) was over a quantitative restriction aimed at 
an environmental objective, it was examined by the panel and Appellate Body under the terms of 
GATT Article XX (General Exceptions).
10 Technical regulations can be and are used to 
accomplish comparable objectives. 
 
There are several pending consultations that cite TBT issues for food products. Only one 
cites the TBT Agreement but not the SPS Agreement. It involves a request by the Philippines, 
                                                 
10 Whether a ban is a technical regulation was recently questioned in the asbestos case.  The Appellate Body decided 
that a ban was a technical regulation in this particular case but that the matter has to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.  
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Australia, and Japan regarding the US import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products 
(WT/DS61/1, WT/DS61/2, WT/DS61/3) which is related to the case referenced in the preceding 
paragraph. Other requests also cite the SPS Agreement, and TBT issues will likely be secondary. 
These include requests by the US involving Korean testing and inspection of agricultural 
products (WT/DS3/1, WT/DS41/1); by the European Communities regarding US measures 
affecting imports of poultry products (WT/DS100/1); and by Canada regarding US measures 
affecting the import of cattle, swine, and grain (WT/DS144/1). In regard to TBTs, most of these 
consultations involve Article 2 of the Agreement, addressing preparation, adoption and 
application of technical regulations, and Articles 5, 6, or 7, which have to do with procedures for 
conformity assessment. 
 
Overall, experience with the application of the TBT Agreement to food products is 
relatively limited. However, the consultations and panels that have resulted in mutually agreed 
solutions indicate that the definition of like products and the assessment of whether measures are 
least trade restrictive are likely to be of key importance. Although not in evidence yet, a case 
may emerge that require further articulation of the criteria for whether a technical regulation for 
a non-safety food attribute pursues a legitimate objective. For example, the labeling of a process 
attribute based on the consumer’s right to know for a controversial attribute (e.g., animal welfare, 
GMOs) may provide such a test in the future. 
 
There has been even less activity to date regarding the application of the TRIPS Agreement 
to geographical indications. In 1999, the US requested consultation with the European 
Communities regarding protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural 
products and foodstuffs (WT/DS174/1). The US argued that the EC had not ensured national 
treatment in this area, nor to ensure that protection for geographical indications avoid 
undermining legal protection for pre-existing trademarks. No other activity has occurred 
regarding food products under the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The Key Role of Labeling for Other Quality Attributes 
 
The use of labeling has a prominent role in the regulation of other quality attributes. In part 
this is because labeling may be a government’s preferred response to information problems 
perceived in a market. Labeling allows products with different quality levels to be offered while 
protecting consumers from deception or supporting the consumer’s right to know about product 
attributes. In other cases, labeling may be a second-choice response that is used when direct 
regulation of the quality attribute for both domestic and imported products is not a viable option 
under international trade rules. In either case, labeling programs are an integral part of many 
countries’ approaches to regulation of other quality attributes. Thus, labeling is a central issue in 
WTO negotiations on trade in food products, as summarized in Table 1.2.  
 
In the current agricultural negotiations and elsewhere, several countries are emphasizing 
their desire and right to base policy on a range of factors important to their societies. Japan, for 
example, states it pursues five major points in its policy, the first of which is “consideration of 
the multifunctionality of agriculture” (G/AG/NG/W/91). It further states that “trade rules that 
enable only a particular type of agriculture which focuses on efficiency to thrive, would naturally 
be rejected not only by Japan but also by other countries.” Japan also lists as one of its five major  
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points “consideration for the concerns of consumers and civil society” and defines this in part as 
the promotion of consumers’ confidence when making choices about food. It is clear that the 
support of multifunctionality will frequently involve the use of labels to communicate diverse 
sources of value to consumers. 
 
Some countries view the promotion of animal welfare as an important policy goal. The EC 
has stated its objective as “ensuring that trade does not undermine our efforts in improving the 
protection of the welfare of animals,” while avoiding trade protectionism (G/AG/NG/W/19). It 
proposes an approach concerning animal welfare that urges consideration of a range of standards, 
compensation payments, and labeling to accommodate consumers’ interest in higher animal 
welfare and their right to make informed choice between products, including products produced 
to different welfare standards. 
 
In September 2000, the EC notified its intention to the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade to amend its regulation on marketing standards for eggs to require the labeling of eggs and 
their packs by type of farming of hens (G/TBT/Notif.00/428). The stated objective of this 
regulation is to prevent consumers from being misled and to allow consumers to make informed 
choices on the basis of farming methods. This proposal raised concerns among several trading 
partners and the EC is further considering its proposed rule. 
 
There are many additional examples of countries’ interest in the labeling of other quality 
attributes, particularly process and production methods. Prominent among these are various 
forms of ecolabeling that communicate the environmental impact of products to consumers. 
These programs are frequently voluntary and may be administered by an array of private 
certification agencies. Colombia has argued that voluntary labeling schemes can act as a barrier 
to trade and it is essential that the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and 
Application of Standards included in the TBT Agreement (Annex 3) be applied to these schemes. 
A notification by Japan that it would require that all foods and beverages sold to consumers carry 
country of origin labeling has raised controversy as well (G/TBT/Notif.99/668). The Japanese 
government stated the objective of this regulation as the protection of the consumers’ interest so 
that consumers’ wishes for information in selecting commodities were fulfilled. All these 
examples indicate that labeling will be more widely used and for a greater range of purposes in 
coming years. As a result, the TBT Agreement will have a greater role to play in setting the rules 
for international trade in food products. 
 
Furthermore, labeling programs that currently fall under the TRIPS Agreement are also 
likely to take a larger role in affecting food trade. For example, a recent proposal by the EC for 
rules concerning food quality (G/AG/NG/W/18) stated as an objective to improve market access 
and fair competition opportunities for regional and traditional products. Several other countries 
have supported the idea that geographical indications should be extended to a wider range of 
agricultural products but such proposals have met with some resistance in selected cases. 
 
Future WTO Regulation of Other Quality Attributes 
There have been no direct calls for reopening the TBT Agreement in a new round of WTO 
negotiations. However, as the prior examples indicate, issues that have TBT dimensions are 
widely discussed in relation to the Agreement on Agriculture, the SPS Agreement, and the  
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general negotiations. Key examples are the ability of countries to protect aspects of their 
agricultural and food production systems, especially to ensure non-safety attributes, and to 
promote local development. For developed countries, the discussion over the use of the 
precautionary principle, the multifunctionality of agriculture, and the role of other legitimate 
factors in regulatory decision making all tie directly to TBT issues or become TBT issues when 
other avenues for regulation are blocked. For developing countries, escalating technical 
regulation standards are a major concern in terms of market access, as described in a subsequent 
section of this commissioned paper. 
 
The continuing negotiations on agriculture, and a new WTO round when it materializes, 
will have to attempt to fashion a coordinated approach to the regulation of non-safety food 
attributes. This will include product regulations, process regulations, and related labeling 
programs. An example where a coordinated approach is needed is the regulation of animal 
production practices on the farm with the objective of improving animal welfare. Adoption of 
such regulations may place a country’s domestic producers at a cost disadvantage vis-à-vis 
producers in other countries. Within the Agreement on Agriculture, countries may wish to 
legitimize payments to support these changes in production methods. Instead, or in addition, they 
may rely on labeling regimes that communicate production practices to consumers in the hope 
that domestic consumers will buy the products produced under the domestic process regulations 
and reject domestic or foreign products that are not. At the same time, the regulations on 
production practices may have safety implications that bring the SPS Agreement into play—this 
type of issue often spans several WTO agreements. Such issues will test the comprehensiveness 
of the WTO agreements as a whole. Some countries assert that such measures fall between 
cracks of the Uruguay Round agreements. For example, in its proposal on animal welfare and 
trade in agriculture, the EC asserts that “the WTO does not provide a framework within which to 
address animal welfare issues” (G/AG/NG/W/19).  
 
The TRIPS Agreement will come increasingly into play if geographical indications are 
more widely used for a broader variety of process and product characteristics. This issue is likely 
to get more attention as several countries have indicated their interest in expanding the scope and 
use of geographical indications. 
 
In this situation, what set of regulatory practices, spanning several WTO agreements, will 
establish the desirable balance between country level regulatory choice and prevention of 
unnecessary barriers to trade? Different countries have very different views on this balance and 
are implementing divergent strategies. Resolving this conflict is key to resolving potential trade 
disputes over a myriad of process related issues such as animal welfare, organic production, 
ecolabeling, and GMO labeling. 
 
Discussion of the future of disciplines on regulation of other quality attributes is integrally 
related to developments in other areas of the negotiations. The TBT Agreement can be expected 
to take on increased prominence because of the interest in regulating and/or labeling non-safety 
product and particularly process attributes of food products. In addition, fairly strict discipline in 
the area of SPS regulation will lead countries to define policies to fit within the realm of the TBT 
Agreement, where challenge may be less likely to be successful. For example, in adopting a new 
GMO labeling regime, the Australia New Zealand Food Authority emphasized that the regime  
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was not safety related but strictly related to informing consumers, as described in more depth in 
the following section. In other words, it defined its action as a technical regulation to which the 
TBT Agreement would apply. 
 
It will remain challenging to analyze the overall welfare impacts of the many types of 
technical regulations and their related conformity assessment systems. This is especially true for 
regulations whose objective is the prevention of consumer deception or the support of a 
consumer’s right to know, where risk perception and prediction of what consumers would do 
under the proposed market situation (e.g. a new labeling scheme) play a major role in evaluating 
the impact. Furthermore, some countries may argue that some of their regulations are not in a 
sense subject to the evaluation criteria set out in the WTO agreements. They may simply say 
“This is the way we do it in our country, this is who we are, and we have a right to regulate in a 
way that is consistent with the desires of our citizens.” The balance between country choice and 
trade liberalization in the area of technical regulations is a clear source of tension within the 
WTO today.  




This section turns to the regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In an 
earlier analysis, Nelson et al (1999) characterized national GMO regulations as a “patchwork.” 
Many countries have handed regulatory responsibility for agricultural biotechnology to multiple 
agencies that deal with agriculture, the environment, and food safety, and these agencies have 
then typically grafted regulations concerning agricultural biotechnology onto existing regulations 
relating to release of new varieties, use of pesticides, and marketing of food products. This 
patchwork will not be, in and of itself, the cause of international frictions over biotechnology 
regulation. As discussed later, the WTO is unlikely to get involved in the means by which 
specific countries develop their regulatory processes. However, there is a lack of international 
coordination of certain aspects of GMO regulation that is generating the likelihood of future 
trade disputes. 
 
This lack of international coordination is characterized by two key approaches to GMO 
regulation. The first, followed by the United States and Canada, is based on a scientific, risk-
based assessment of GMOs and the principle of substantial equivalence. The second approach is 
for countries, such as those in the EU, to adhere to the precautionary principle as they revise or 
develop their regulatory regimes, and/or to adopt rules and guidelines for the mandatory labeling 
of GMOs and foods containing genetically modified (GM) ingredients. Recent developments in 
GM regulation have partly been the political response to widespread public concerns about 
biotechnology. As a result, disputes are likely to arise due to the inevitable tension between 
scientifically based regulations, and the desire to embody non-scientific issues such as ethical 
considerations. 
 
Patterns of Regulation   
 
  A broad description of the types of regulations in use for those countries where 
information is available is presented in Table 4.1. What is most obvious from the table is that the 
majority of countries either has implemented or is considering implementing mandatory labeling 
of GM foods, although there is some range in the threshold being applied. It is useful to be more 
explicit about three country groupings, as it aids in discussion of differences in key approaches to 
regulation, and in illustrating those features of existing GMO regulatory regimes most likely to 
generate conflict in terms of the Uruguay Round agreements. 
 
Country Grouping 1: Substantial Equivalence 
 
This group consists of three major agricultural exporting countries, the United States, 
Canada, and Argentina, which have either a high level of development of agricultural 
biotechnology and/or high rates of commercial adoption of GM crops. Of these countries, the US 
and Canada account for nearly 70 percent of the 10,313 GMO field trials reported in the OECD’s 
Field Trial Database, and also account for 63 of the 74 entries in the OECD’s Biotech Product 
Database of GM products that have either received or are in the process of receiving commercial 
approval (OECD 2001). In addition, the three countries account for the bulk of the global 
commercial plantings of the four major GM crops, corn, soybeans, canola, and cotton.  
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Argentina  ?  Y  Y 
 
Y  
(corn, cotton, and 
soybeans, ban on 
new approvals at 
present) 
No rules 




Y (38)  Voluntary 
guidelines 




















Y  Y  Y 
(procedures 
similar to EC 
Directives) 
?  Mandatory 
European 
Union 




Y (10)  Mandatory 
(1%) 
Bulgaria  Y  Y  Y 
(procedures 
similar to EC 
Directives) 
?  Mandatory 
Hungary  Y  Y  Y 
(procedures 
similar to EC 
Directives) 
?  Mandatory  
Japan  Y  Y  Y  Y (20)  Mandatory 
(5%) 








Norway  Y  ?  Y 
 
Y  Mandatory 
(2%)  
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Russia  Y  ?  Y  ?  Mandatory 
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Switzerland  Y  Y  Y  ?  Mandatory 




?  Mandatory under 
discussion, 





Brazil   CTNBio  Y  Y  Soybean approval 
suspended, and 





Chile  ?  Y  ?  ?  Mandatory 
(1%) 
Hong Kong  ?  ?  ?  ?  Likely voluntary 
(5%) 
Indonesia  ?  ?  Y  ?  Mandatory  
Malaysia  Y  ?  Y  Y (soybeans))  Preference for 
no labeling  
Mexico  Y  Y  Cibiogem 
developing 
?  Mandatory under 
discussion 
Philippines  ?  Y  ?  ?  Mandatory under 
discussion 
Saudi Arabia  ?  ?  Y 
(proposed 
import ban) 
N  Mandatory 
Singapore  ?  ?  Case-by-case  ?  No scheme 
proposed 
Sri Lanka  ?  ?  Import ban  ?  ? 
Thailand  Y  Y  Y  Y (40)  No scheme 
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In 2000, of the 107.76 million acres planted worldwide, 98 percent was planted in these three 
countries, the most being planted in the United States at 68 percent of the global total. Argentina 
accounted for 23 percent and Canada 7 percent (James 2000). 
 
Of the three countries, the US and Canada have the most developed and well-documented 
GMO regulatory systems in place. These systems have been under public scrutiny over the past 
two years, but they have not yet been changed in any substantive way. In the US, biotechnology 
regulation is conducted via three agencies. USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS) provides permits for introduction of genetically engineered organisms into the United 
States, and also regulates the small-scale field-testing of GM plants prior to their 
commercialization. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates plants that are 
genetically engineered to express pesticides, such as Bt corn. The US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) is responsible for regulation of pre-market approval of GMOs and foods 
containing GM ingredients, and also providing guidelines on the labeling of GM foods. 
 
The FDA has been at the forefront of articulating the doctrine of substantial equivalence 
as a basis for regulation of GMOs, and it is worth laying out its approach to biotechnology 
regulation in detail, as it would likely form the basis of any position the US would take in a 
GMO trade dispute. The issues of labeling and regulation of GM foods were first addressed by 
the FDA in 1992 (Korwek 2000). Essentially, the FDA drew on the Federal Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), focusing on sections 403 (a) and 201 (n) (FDA 1992). The first of these 
requires that food or food ingredients should be described by their common name, while the 
second requires that labeling of food should detail all facts that are “material,” and deals with the 
circumstances under which labeling can be either false or misleading. The concept of materiality 
relates to information about the attributes of food products, and the FDA has typically required 
labeling of foods with information that addresses a health risk or substantiates quantitatively any 
claims made about nutrient content of the food product (FDA 2001). 
 
  The FDA’s 1992 position was very clear. Labeling of GM foods was not required. First, 
FDA took the position that recombinant DNA methods of plant development are not material 
information under the terms of sections 403(a) and 201(n) of the FFDCA. Essentially, the FDA 
argued that crop development through genetic modification is simply an extension to the 
molecular level of traditional plant breeding methods. Second, the FDA established the principle 
that existing GM foods do not differ in any substantial way from those developed through 
traditional plant breeding methods. This principle of substantial equivalence also establishes the 
circumstances under which the FDA would require labeling of a GM-food product: if the GM 
version of an existing food product is substantially different, if the GM version has very different 
nutritional properties, or if the GM food contains an allergen that would not normally be present 
in that food product. Except insofar as genetic modification could change food in the manner just 
suggested, there is no explicit right to know labeling requirement in the FD&C Act. In other 
words, consumers have no explicit right to know how their food was processed, but there are 
limited rights in terms of the food itself. In a recent review of its position on labeling, the FDA 
concluded: 
 
The agency is still not aware of any data or other information that would form a basis for 
concluding that the fact that a food or its ingredients was produced using bioengineering is a  
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material fact that must be disclosed under sections 403(a) and 201(n) of the act. FDA is therefore 
reaffirming its decision to not require special labeling of all bioengineered foods (FDA, January 
2001, p.6). 
 
In addition to reaffirming its position on the labeling of genetically modified foods, the FDA in 
its recent policy statement also laid out guidelines for the appropriate, non-misleading labeling of 
both foods that have been bio-engineered, and foods that are either not genetically modified or 
do not contain GM ingredients 
 
GMO regulation in Canada is very similar to the US in terms of the involvement of 
multiple agencies, pre-market approval of products, and the principles on which the approach to 
regulation and labeling is based. Food labeling in Canada is currently regulated under the Food 
and Drugs Act. While legislation covering GM food labeling remains under development, 
government guidelines rest on the view that there should be mandatory labeling only if there is a 
food safety concern over a product, and that voluntary positive labeling and voluntary negative 
labeling be allowed, provided the relevant claims are factual and neither misleading nor 
deceptive. For example, a positive label might state “product contains GM ingredients” and a 
negative label might state “product contains no GM ingredients.” 
 
The key to US and Canadian approaches to regulation of GMOs is the principle of 
minimal oversight of food products that are generally regarded as safe (GRAS). Conventional 
food products are considered GRAS, and this is the standard by which GM foods are being 
judged in these countries. The approach recognizes that zero tolerance for potentially hazardous 
ingredients in food would result in few foods ever being marketed. As a result, if ingredients in 
GM foods are substantially equivalent to their conventional counterparts and if the existing food 
is GRAS, then the GM version is also regarded as safe. However, if the GM food contains 
ingredients that differ substantially from ingredients already in the conventional version of the 
food, pre-market review is required. This regulatory approach, based on the concept of 
substantial equivalence, is consistent with recommendations made by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO)/World Health Organization (WHO) (1995, 1996) for assessing the safety of 
GMOs, and the principles for evaluation of GM foods put forward by the OECD (1993). 
 
Country Grouping 2: Precautionary Principle and Mandatory Labeling 
 
This group consists of two sub-groups: countries with relatively well-developed 
regulatory systems, such as the EU, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand; and countries that are 
either independently developing their own systems of regulation, such as Norway and 
Switzerland, or are following the lead of the first sub-group, such as Hungary, Poland, and South 
Korea. Countries in the first sub-group can be characterized as having approved a number of 
GMOs during the 1990s, but adoption of such crops has been very limited. For example, in 2000, 
Spain, Germany and France had small areas of Bt corn, and Australia a small area of Bt cotton 
(James op. cit.). They have also significantly revised their approaches to regulation in light of 
concerns expressed by their consuming publics. In addition, their approaches to regulation 
reflect, to differing degrees, application of the precautionary principle, and many other countries 
in both Eastern and Central Europe, and South East Asia, either have or are likely to implement 
similar regulatory systems.  
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Prior to June 1999, the EU had approved 10 GM products for commercial marketing, 
including both GM corn and soybeans. These had been approved under a system of two Council 
directives, and one regulation. Directive 90/219/EEC concerns the management of GMO 
research and development, covering containment and control, record keeping, emergency 
planning, and notification. Directive 90/220/EEC covers the deliberate release of GMOs, the 
main elements of the directive requiring notification of the release to the relevant authority in the 
Member State where the GMO would first be marketed. After review, the Member State can give 
consent to the marketing. Finally, the Novel Foods Regulation, No. 258/97, was adopted in 
January 1997. This regulation established an approval procedure for novel foods and novel food 
ingredients, which are defined either as foods or food ingredients containing or consisting of 
GMOs, or foods and food ingredients produced from but not containing GMOs. In addition, the 
Novel Foods Regulation requires both unprocessed GMOs and foods that may contain GMOs to 
be labeled, and that labels must indicate whether it is no longer equivalent to the conventional 
version of that food. The labeling rules were subsequently refined such that food products 
containing at least one percent of GM corn or soybeans would have to be labeled as GM 
products. 
 
In June 1999, the EU placed a moratorium on further approvals of GMOs. The Council of 
the European Union also recommended that a thoroughly precautionary approach be taken to 
future approval of GMOs, and that GMOs should not be placed on the market until it can be 
demonstrated that there is no adverse impact on human health and the environment. On February 
14, 2001, the European Parliament voted in favor of a revised Directive 90/220/EEC, and the 
Council of Ministers adopted the revised directive on February 15, 2001 (EU Parliament and 
Council 2001). Along with legislative proposals on traceability and labeling of GMOs to be 
released in April this year, the revised directive should see the resumption of the process for EU 
approval of GMOs, although Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg have all 
stated they want the current moratorium to remain in force. 
 
The revised directive has important implications for the future approval of GMOs in the 
EU, and will almost certainly impact other countries’ approaches to GMO regulation. The 
directive has several important regulatory features relating to the general obligations of Member 
States:  (1) the precautionary principle should be applied to ensure appropriate measures are 
taken to avoid any adverse effects on human health and the environment from the release and 
marketing of GMOs; (2) an environmental risk assessment has to be carried out before any 
notification is made to the relevant EU authority of intent to release a GMO; (3) the use of 
antibiotic resistance marker genes is to be phased out by the end of 2004 in the case of 
commercial release of GMOs and by the end of 2008 for research purposes; (4) assessment of 
risk should be conducted on a case-by-case basis; and (5) Member States are required to take 
measures to ensure traceability at all stages of the placing on the market of GMOs. 
 
The revised directive is also very clear on the commercial marketing of either GMOs or 
products containing GMOs. The notification procedure requires, among other things, an 
environmental risk assessment, a plan for monitoring, a proposal for labeling, and a proposal for 
packaging. The Member State receiving notification has 90 days to respond to the notification. If 
consent is given to market the GMO, the period of consent will last for at most 10 years, and will 
be subject to evaluation prior to renewal.   
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In terms of EU-wide circulation of GMOs, the directive states that no Member State can 
restrict marketing of any GMO that has met the requirements for approval. There is, however, a 
safeguard clause which allows a Member State to provisionally restrict or prohibit marketing of a 
GMO if it has either new or additional information about the risk to human health and the 
environment made available since the date of consent. In addition, where either an objection is 
raised as regards the risk of a GMO to human health and the environment, or where consent is 
not given to place the GMO on the market, the European Commission will consult the relevant 
Scientific Committee. The European Commission may also consult the relevant committees 
concerning any ethical implications of biotechnology, and it is expected to implement the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
 
Japan is also an interesting case of how public concerns over the safety of GMOs have 
affected the regulatory process. Between 1992 and 1999, Japan approved 37 GM crops, 
including soybeans, corn, and canola. In early 2000, Japan announced that suppliers of GM foods 
must provide proof of their safety prior to sale. So far, over 20 GM foods have been approved for 
use. As of April 2001, imports of foods containing GM ingredients that have not been approved 
will be banned. In addition, Japan has announced that, as of April 1, 2001, it will require the 
mandatory labeling and import notification for perishable and processed foods that are either 
genetically modified or contain GM ingredients. The draft of the regulation lists 24 different 
processed foods and ingredients, derived from corn and soybeans, which must be labeled if used 
as a “main ingredient” in a food product. The term main ingredient is defined to be the top three 
ingredients by weight, where each must weigh 5 percent or more of the food. Foods such as oils 
and other highly processed foods are exempt if they do not contain detectable levels of GMOs. 
Japan seems to be introducing even more rigorous mandatory labeling regulations than those 
currently adopted in the EU. 
 
Finally, Australia and New Zealand are included in this sub-group because they have 
processes in place for pre-market approval and have implemented regulations for the mandatory 
labeling of GM foods. It should be noted though that neither country refers to the precautionary 
principle in its regulatory language. Australia and New Zealand regulate food safety together 
through the Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA) and the Australia New Zealand 
Food Standards Council (ANZFSC). Specifically, the marketing of GMO foods is regulated 
through Standard A18 of the Australian Food Standards Code. This standard requires that a 
safety assessment, based on a scientific risk-based approach be conducted on all foods produced 
with biotechnology. Standard A18 provides an exemption for those foods currently on the market 
if an application was accepted by ANZFA prior to April 30, 1999, the food is lawfully permitted 
in another country, and the ANZFSC has not obtained evidence showing the food is a risk to 
public health.  
 
The ANZFA guidelines make a very clear reference to the concept of substantial 
equivalence and its application in food safety assessment, referring to the OECD principles 
(OECD 1993). In this sense, the Australian and New Zealand regulations are very similar to 
those of Canada and the US, with similar principles in place for risk assessment (ANZFA 2000). 
In contrast to Canada and the US, however, ANZSFC promulgated new mandatory labeling rules 
in July 2000. The new standard requires the labeling of food and food ingredients where rDNA 
and/or novel protein is present. It also requires labeling of food and ingredients where the food  
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has altered characteristics. There are a number of exemptions to the requirement, including 
highly processed foods where rDNA and/or novel proteins have been removed through refining, 
food prepared at the point of sale. Any one ingredient in a food is allowed to contain up to 1 
percent of GM material whose presence is unintended. ANZFA makes clear that it implemented 
mandatory labeling not because of any safety issue, but rather on a “right to know” basis, to give 
consumers information so that they can make an informed choice if they have ethical, 
environmental, religious, or other reasons for avoiding GM foods (ANZFA 2000).  
 
In summary, the first sub-group in this country grouping can be characterized as having 
probably the most rigorous regulations with regards to either pre-market approval and/or GMO 
labeling. The EU has adopted a restrictive set of regulations, and it would seem that Japan is 
following suit. Australia and New Zealand have implemented a system of pre-market approval 
that is more in line with the approach adopted by the Canada and the US, but their labeling 
regulations, which they claim to be more stringent than those of the EU, are mandatory, and 
reflect a response to consumer concerns about GM foods. It might also be argued that as 
agricultural exporters, Australia and New Zealand are attempting to differentiate themselves 
from the US and Canada by adopting labeling. 
 
The second sub-group consists of those European countries such as Norway, Russia, and 
Switzerland that have implemented GM regulations, including mandatory labeling rules, and also 
those Eastern and Central European countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland that have adopted regulations that are similar to those contained in the EC Directive 
90/220. South Korea is also included as it is likely to implement labeling regulations similar to 
those being adopted in Japan. 
 
In Norway, food and food ingredients either composed of or containing GM ingredients 
must be approved. A regulation was also introduced in March 2000 that will prohibit the use of 
antibiotic resistance marker genes in the production, import, and sale of foods and food 
ingredients. Norway has also developed guidelines for the mandatory labeling of all GM foods 
and food ingredients, if the product contains a GM ingredient that constitutes more than 2 
percent of the ingredient. In the case of Russia, registration of GM foods and ingredients is 
required, with registration certificates being valid for three years. As of July 2000, Russia also 
issued a decree that all GM foods be labeled, although highly refined foods such as oils are 
exempt if they do not contain proteins. GM foods and ingredients have to be authorized in 
Switzerland in consultation with multiple agencies. Notably, authorization is granted if all danger 
to health can be excluded in light of the current scientific information. In addition, since 1995, all 
GM foods and GM food ingredients must be labeled in Switzerland. GM-free labeling can be 
used if it can be proven the food is not genetically modified and no GM organisms were used in 
production of the food. 
 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have all, to some degree, opted for 
regulations that are harmonized with those of the EU, which is not surprising given their likely 
future accession to the EU. Poland’s regulations are explicitly conformable to EC Directive 
90/220, and Hungary’s regulations contain language explicitly referring to EC directives. 
Hungary also adopted mandatory labeling of GM foods and foods containing GM ingredients as 
of July 1999. Bulgaria and the Czech Republic have probably the clearest set of guidelines  
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referring to both introduction of GMOs into the environment, and the placing of GM products on 
the market. In Bulgaria, applications for release and marketing of a GMO, which must contain a 
risk assessment, are submitted to Council for Safe Use of Genetically Modified Higher Plants, 
which then has to make a decision within a month. If a license is granted, the firm 
releasing/marketing the GMO must label the product accordingly. In the Czech Republic, firms 
must register a GMO with the Ministry of the Environment. The registration must include, 
amongst other things, a risk assessment. Similar to EU regulations, the Ministry of the 
Environment must issue a decision within 90 days of application. If a product is approved for 
commercial use, mandatory labeling must be used, stating it is a “genetically modified 
organism,” or that “this product contains a genetically modified organism.”  
 
In the case of South Korea, a bill is under consideration that will require importers of GM 
foods and processed foods containing GM ingredients to receive approval prior to import, with 
specific reference to corn and soybean imports. The bill has been prepared in response to the 
requirements of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and is likely to be in force later in 2001. In 
terms of labeling, Korea is likely to implement GM standards similar to those being developed in 
Japan. In April 2000, Korea released guidelines that would mandate labeling for products using 
GM products as a major ingredient, these products being corn, soybeans, and bean sprouts. These 
guidelines are likely to be implemented in July 2001. 
 
Country Grouping 3: Cartagena Protocol and Nascent Regulations   
 
Finally there is a group of countries that either have some limited regulations in place, are 
developing regulations, or are less developed country signatories of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. Indonesian regulations currently require a safety review and labeling of GM foods and 
ingredients, while in June 2000, Chile approved a decree that requires mandatory labeling of GM 
foods or foods containing GM ingredients at levels of 1 percent or higher. Mexico and the 
Phillippines are also both considering mandatory GM labeling regulations. In Thailand, 40 GM 
plants have been exempted from being prohibited in the use of processed foods and animal feeds, 
although this amendment does not exempt these plants as either imports or for domestic planting. 
Thailand currently has no scheme in place for labeling, which is also the case in Malaysia, and 
Singapore, while Hong Kong is likely to put a voluntary scheme in place. In contrast, Saudi 
Arabia has proposed an import ban on GMOs and has a mandatory labeling scheme in place. Sri 
Lanka has banned imports of GMOs. 
 
Brazil is an interesting case in light of its importance in the global soybean complex. The 
Brazilian Biosafety Law was enacted in 1995, prohibiting entry of GMOs without prior approval. 
Under this law, CTNbio approved both GM soybeans for planting in Brazil, and also decided to 
allow Bt corn to be imported from Argentina for use in animal feed. A federal judge, however, 
subsequently stopped the commercial planting of GM soybeans, and the Brazilian government 
used the Biosafety Law to block imports of Bt corn. In addition, Brazil is expected to implement 
mandatory labeling of foods containing more than 5 percent GM ingredients. 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity was 
finalized and adopted by 133 governments on January 29, 2000, and now has to be ratified by the 
parliaments of 50 signatories before coming into effect. It is likely that this will provide a guide  
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to many developing countries as they develop and implement their regulations on GMOs. A key 
to the Biosafety Protocol is that, in accordance with the precautionary approach, as contained in 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, its objective is to ensure 
that the transfer, handling, and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) does not have an 
adverse effect on biological diversity and impose risks on human health. There are several key 
features of the Protocol. Anyone wishing to export an LMO has to inform the relevant authority 
in the importing country of the intentional trans-boundary movement of the LMO. The importing 
country then has 90 days in which to notify the exporter of its decision as to whether trans-
boundary movement can proceed. The decision to allow the import has to include a scientifically 
sound risk assessment. In addition, there is a process for notification of any LMO that is placed 
on the market for direct use as food or feed, or for processing. 
 
Of key interest are clauses that state that lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient 
relevant scientific information of any adverse effects of the LMO should not prevent an importer 
from taking a decision to minimize potential adverse effects. In addition, any LMO intended for 
marketing as either food, feed, or processing has to be clearly identified that they “may contain” 
LMOs and are not intended for introduction into the environment. LMOs that are intended for 
either contained use or intentional introduction into the environment have to be clearly identified 
along with documentation of the requirements relating to aspects such as traits, safe handling, 
storage, and transport. Finally, in reaching a decision over whether to approve imports, a country 
may take into account, consistent with their international obligations, any socio-economic 
considerations relating to the impact of LMOs on the value of biological diversity to indigenous 
and local communities. 
 
GM Regulations and the WTO 
 
The preceding discussion suggests the potential for international conflict between the two 
approaches being adopted to regulate GMOs. On the one hand, there is the US/Canadian 
approach to evaluating GMOs, which is based on a scientific, risk-based assessment that also 
appeals to the concept of substantial equivalence, and the notion that zero risk in food safety 
regulation is not practical, given that conventional foods are already presumed to be safe. On the 
other hand, there is the regulatory approach adopted by the EU, and the Biosafety Protocol, that 
is based on a precautionary approach to risk assessment and management of GMOs. The first 
formal complaint to the WTO over GMO import regulations did not arise between the US and 
EU, instead it concerned a prohibition on imports by Egypt from Thailand of canned tuna packed 
in GM soybean oil (WT/DS205/1). While this dispute has now been settled, it is indicative of the 
likelihood of conflict over GMO regulations as they impact international trade. In addition, the 
negotiating proposals put forward in the first phase of the agriculture negotiations by the US, 
Japan, Korea and Switzerland relating to GMOs suggest that further disputes may occur. 
 
Given the potential for conflict, how do GM regulations fit into the rules of the WTO?  It 
should be obvious from the discussion that much of the regulation of GMOs is not focused 
directly on trade. The WTO explicitly recognizes the right of countries to adopt measures that 
protect human, plant and animal health (GATT Article XX). In this sense, the Biosafety Protocol 
is not in conflict with obligations countries have under the WTO (Anderson and Nielsen 2001). 
The WTO would, however, be involved in any potential conflict over GMO regulation insofar as 
there are rules on import restrictions contained in the GATT 1994, and the SPS and TBT  
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Agreements. It is not clear yet whether the rights to restrict trade in LMOs as embodied in the 
Biosafety Protocol will generate conflict with the WTO agreements.  
 
One main principle in the WTO that would impinge on the regulation of GMOs in world 
trade is that of non-discrimination. It would neither be WTO consistent to ban imports of GM 
products from one WTO member and allow them from another, nor to impose restrictions on 
imported GM products if such restrictions were not imposed on domestic producers of the GM 
product. However, it is unlikely that the EU, for example, would either explicitly discriminate 
against US exports of GM products, or allow domestic production of a GM product with limited 
regulation, but impose extensive regulations on the imported product.  
 
More controversially, there might be a claim of discrimination when a major trader such 
as the EU, as a deliberate act of trade policy, were to ban imports of a GM product but allow 
imports of the conventional product. GATT Article III states countries cannot discriminate 
between like goods on the basis of country of origin. The key issue in any GMO dispute will be 
the definition of “like goods.” Does either genetic modification or presence of GM ingredients 
constitute sufficient grounds for differentiation from conventional products? By the principle of 
substantial equivalence used in the US and Canada, import rules targeted specifically at GMOs 
would be considered discriminatory, whereas by the EU’s concept of equivalence, GMOs are not 
viewed as being the same as their conventional counterparts, and, hence, are not “like goods.” 
 
In terms of the differing approaches to risk assessment and labeling of GMOs being 
adopted, there is an issue of how these will be evaluated in terms of the SPS and TBT 
Agreements. The standard interpretation of the SPS Agreement is that an import ban on a GM 
product would have to meet the risk assessment criteria of the agreement, and scientific 
justification would have to be made if risk aversion exceeded international standards. The point 
of conflict might be where, for example, the US has approved a GM product under its regulatory 
system, whereas the EU appealing to the precautionary principle determines there is still a 
scientific reason not to approve that product for import.  
 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows WTO member states to take precautionary 
measures if scientific information is unavailable, but at the same time members have to seek 
additional risk-assessment information. Interpretation of the precautionary principle, and its 
potential application to GMO regulations has triggered a good deal of debate in the popular and 
scientific media (Foster, Vecchia and Repacholi 2000). The EU has issued an important 
communication in this respect (February 2000). It describes the framework for science-based risk 
assessment, and lay out guidelines for implementing the principle in a transparent manner: 
specifically, zero risk must not be aimed for; implementation should be non-discriminatory and 
consistent with measures taken in equivalent areas where the scientific data are available; 
cost/benefit analysis should be conducted; and any measures taken should be provisional pending 
new more reliable scientific data becoming available. The communication, however, is vague on 
what weight of evidence is required for triggering the precautionary principle and how much 
evidence of safety has to be provided for a new technology to be approved. It remains to be seen 
whether the EU’s precautionary approach to regulating GMOs will be found in violation of the 
SPS Agreement, especially if, as suggested by this communication, the EU aims to implement a 
science-based risk assessment.   
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An additional problem arises in that the EU, and other members of the WTO, may appeal 
to ethical, cultural, and religious grounds for restricting/banning imports of GM foods. Such 
language is clearly contained in Article 29 of the EU’s revision of Directive 90/220, and also 
Article 26 of the Biosafety Protocol. GATT Article XX (a) allows the use of trade barriers to 
protect public morals, but there is insufficient detail in the article to predict how a dispute panel 
might rule in a specific GMO case. The Codex Committee on General Principles continues to 
debate the role of the precautionary principle.  
 
GMO products highlight the potential tension between the focus of the GATT/WTO on 
establishing rules to promote trade, and increasing demands that various other concerns be 
incorporated into the regulatory system for global markets. One problem with ethical concerns 
entering into trade regulations is that most countries are themselves just beginning to grapple 
with such issues through public debate. Even in countries such as the US, where agricultural 
biotechnology receives considerably more public support than in the EU, extension of 
biotechnology to the commercialization of animal cloning is likely to foster much more 
extensive debate over ethical issues (The Economist, April 14, 2001). It might be expecting too 
much of existing WTO arrangements to deal with ethical concerns as a basis for GM import 
regulation. Some observers have suggested that the existing SPS and TBT agreements are 
inappropriate for dealing with GMOs, and that new agreements will have to be developed to 
evaluate the legitimacy of consumer and ethical concerns (Perdikis 2000). 
 
Within the current agreements, the use of mandatory labeling may be challenged under 
either the SPS or TBT Agreement. As noted earlier, application of the TBT Agreement to food 
products has so far been very limited. The comments on the EU’s 1998 notification to the TBT 
Committee of its proposed mandatory labeling regime, responses, and the EU’s subsequent 
replies, provide an interesting example of the differing approaches to GMO regulation and the 
potential grounds for a dispute. In its response to comments by the US, the EU states that there is 
a difference between the concept of equivalence, which it intends to apply in labeling of GMOs, 
and the concept of substantial equivalence (G/TBT/W/78). The EU claims that the latter 
principle relates to the process of gaining authorization to place GMOs on the market, while the 
former is used to determine whether GM foods and foods containing GMOs should be labeled. 
Specifically, the EU claims that foods and food ingredients containing either rDNA or proteins 
resulting from genetic modification are not equivalent to their conventional counterparts, and, 
therefore, should be labeled. In further comments, the US argues that the EU provides no support 
for the argument that GM foods and ingredients are not substantially equivalent to foods 
produced by conventional methods, and that food products should not be labeled on the basis of 
production method if their essential characteristics are unchanged (G/TBT/W/94). Australia and 
New Zealand use the principle of substantial equivalence in their approach to GMO regulation, 
yet have adopted labeling. This may seem contradictory, but the principle of consumer 
sovereignty may be more relevant to near-term policy than complex scientific arguments about 
whether GMOs are or are not equivalent to conventionally produced foods. In addition, as 
exporters, these two countries perhaps recognize the potential for differentiating their products 
from those of the US and Canada. Resolution of the GMO labeling argument will have important 
implications for how the WTO handles other disputes over the labeling of products based on 
process as opposed to product characteristics. 
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Developing Country Perspectives 
 
 
    As discussions begin in the negotiations on agriculture as part of the embedded agenda at 
the WTO, and with the possible launch of a new round of multilateral negotiations, the impact of 
standards and technical regulations is of particular concern to developing countries that bear 
additional costs in meeting regulatory requirements for market access. The debates over product 
attributes are important for developing countries both as they seek to expand export markets and 
accelerate domestic regulatory reform.
11 Domestic regulation affecting imports through technical 
requirements, testing, certification, and labeling represent one of the most important new areas of 
focus in continuing liberalization efforts.  
Developing Country Agricultural Trade 
The developing countries, especially the least developed, have a direct stake in 
accelerating global trade in agriculture. This includes removal of discriminatory regulatory 
barriers that restrict trade based on product attributes. A majority of the poorest nations remain 
largely exporters of agricultural products. Between 40-60% of these countries’ populations live 
in rural areas (World Bank 2000). Net food importers also have a stake in removing regulatory 
barriers to trade in agriculture. The difficulty in a trade policy context arises from the complexity 
associated with identifying and quantifying the costs and benefits of regulatory interventions.  
   
The export profile of developing countries overall is characterized by a growing share of 
manufactures exports and declining share of minerals and foods in total exports. Food exports, 
however, remain an essential part of trade in many of the least developed countries. These 
countries have comparative advantage in food production stemming from low-cost labor and 
abundant arable land for cultivation. Food exports from developing countries have exhibited 
steady growth since the early 1980s as shown in Figure 5.1. Growth of food exports was as high 




The shares of five groups of food products exported from middle- and low-income developing 
countries are shown in Figure 5.2. Cereals were the most important export until the mid-1980s, 
but their importance declined substantially in the 1990s. In contrast, processed foods have 
increased as a share of total food exports, and have become increasingly important in the 1990s. 
This trend is likely to continue. Developing countries have leveraged their comparative 
advantage in low-cost labor into the processing stage, and as a result have become increasingly 
competitive in international markets. Thus, product attribute regulations affecting trade will be 
more important over time to developing country exporters.  
                                                 
11 For an overview of the status of implementation of Uruguay Round commitments of particular importance to 
developing countries see Finger and Schuler (1999). Wilson (2000) outlines specific implementation difficulties 
faced by developing countries in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. See also “Technical Barriers to 
Trade: Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Countries,” Statement of the World Bank to the Technical 
Barriers to Trade Committee, World Trade Organization, Geneva, 24 February 2000.  
 
12 Definition of middle- and low-income countries follows that of the World Bank in 1999.  
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Trade Impact of Standards and Regulations  
 
  Standards and product attribute regulations are designed to facilitate information 
exchange, ensure quality, and achieve the provision of public goods, as described throughout this 
commissioned paper. These are also major development goals. The implementation of standards 
and regulations, of course, also involves costs, potentially important costs for developing 
countries when commitments are bound in negotiated agreements. Some of these costs are 
inevitable. They arise from the testing and certification (conformity assessment) procedures 
necessary to determine if a product, such as fresh fish or produce, meets standardized 
requirements justified by scientific risk. Unnecessary and duplicative testing and certification 
requirements, however, impose costs on small and medium sized firms, consumers, and society.  
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In particular, the cost and complexity in determining conformity to varying national technical 
regulations is high and rising (G/TBT/W/130). For Africa, compliance costs are especially high 
under conditions of duplicative requirements for market access (Oyejide, Ogunkola, Bankole 
2001). As Hooker and Caswell (1999) document, SPS measures can raise compliance costs of 
foreign producers in particular, resulting in reduced imports and increased domestic production. 
The history of the GATT and experience under the WTO demonstrate that in practice 
countries may use regulation for simple protectionist purposes. Technical regulations can 
discriminate against foreign suppliers, both in their construction and in their outcomes. They 
may be used to gain strategic trade advantages for domestic firms over foreign competitors. 
Standards are often non-transparent. Regulations may be drafted as barriers to entry that exclude 
both new domestic and foreign firms from a particular market. In small developing countries, 
this can serve to support entrenched monopolies.  
 
    From a development perspective what is needed is a process to rationalize costly 
regulations, along with the type of technical assistance necessary to implement current 
obligations under the WTO. The broad goals for rationalization, advanced through WTO 
negotiations and extension of Uruguay Round commitments in the SPS and TBT Agreements, 
would involve (1) further restricting discriminatory treatment of imports, (2) systematically 
removing duplicative testing requirements for market access, (3) formally recognizing that 
foreign standards can achieve the same level of social or consumer protection as domestic 
standards, (4) making regulation more transparent through a strengthened WTO enquiry point 
mechanism, and (5) scaling regulatory intervention to levels that do not impose excess costs on 
consumers and firms. 
   
Developing countries can face substantial technical constraints imposed by importers. 
Consider for example recent research on food safety standards in Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 
(2000). This work provides estimates of the impact of differing levels of food safety regulation 
based on the EU standard on aflatoxin in food compared to levels suggested by international 
standards. The results suggest that the implementation of the new aflatoxin standard in the EU 
would have a negative impact on African exports of cereals, dried fruits and nuts to Europe. The 
EU standard, which would reduce health risk by approximately 1.4 deaths per billion per year, 
would decrease the African exports by 64 percent, or US$ 670 million, in contrast to regulation set 
at an international standard. 
   
Differences in standards for similar goods in export markets also increase costs. For 
example, differing worldwide standards on aflatoxin diverts trade toward regions where 
regulations are less restrictive and consumption is growing in Eastern and Central Europe, 
Africa, and Latin America, and the Caribbean (Otsuki and Wilson 2001). Increasingly tight 
standards tend to accelerate trade between industrialized countries in groundnuts, where 
regulation is already restrictive. Therefore, lack of consensus on an international standard based 
in sound science provides strong conditions in which developing country exports may be 
restricted and diverted, at a high net welfare cost over time. 
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WTO Disputes and Developing Countries  
 
To date, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has considered a total of 18 disputes related 
to the regulation of agricultural product attributes (see Table 1.1). In procedural terms, these 
cases ranged from requests for consultations through panel and appellate body rulings. Most of 
these complaints have been brought by developed countries against the measures of other 
developed countries, mirroring the overall pattern of disputes before the WTO. However, 
disputes between developed members, such as the United States and the EU, have market access 
implications for developing country exporters as well.  
 
Developing countries have exercised their rights in three complaints against the measures 
of developed countries (EC – Trade Description of Scallops; US – Import Prohibition on Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products; and EC – Restrictions on Rice). Developing countries have also 
made one complaint against another developing country (Egypt – Import Prohibiton on Canned 
Tuna with Genetically Modified Soyoil). They have joined three disputes as third parties and 
were respondents in four cases. In no case has a least developed country been the target of a 
complaint.  
 
Infrastructure to Implement WTO Commitments 
 
Two relevant problems are how to provide the means through which developing countries 
can conduct risk assessment in SPS cases and build the capacity needed to gain market access by 
meeting the required standards of importers. Building on the mechanisms at the WTO and other 
institutions (such as FAO) to share scientific information and risk analysis techniques among 
members is critical. This provides the background context for developing countries in the WTO 
negotiations. Their focus centers largely on the infrastructure needed to implement obligations 
and exercise rights under the agreements. This includes both physical infrastructure and trained 
professionals needed to support regulatory and scientific work by governments.  
 
The most basic of obligations under the SPS Agreement has yet to be achieved by all 
developing countries. Despite the obligation to establish enquiry points, as of 1999 only 76% of 
middle- and low-income WTO members had done so under the SPS Agreement, as shown in 
Table 5.1. This contrasts with 92% of high-income members.  
   
The laboratories, inspection facilities, customs control mechanisms, and other physical 
capital necessary to support implementation of WTO commitments, including notification of 
new regulations, remains a concern for developing countries. Consider the case of Sub Saharan 
Africa. Based on reviews by  Oyejide et al (2000), the Centre for Food Economic Research's 
multi-regional survey of Africa, North Africa, Middle-East and South Asia, and other SPS-
related studies, the following development challenges are apparent: 
 
(1) Improvement of production methods, including grain growing and harvesting technique, 
livestock feeding, slaughtering and milking techniques.  
 
(2) Improvement of transportation and storage methods: transportation time, artisanal technique, 
and sanitation of storage facilities.  
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Table 5.1. WTO Members with Enquiry Points for SPS Measures 
 
Middle and low income countries  High income countries  Year 
Members  Enquiry Points  Members  Enquiry Points 
1995  78  49 (63%)  34  28 (82%) 
1999  98  74 (76%)  36  33 (92%) 
 
Source: Author calculations as based on WTO data. 
 
(3) Improvement of access to compliance resources: assistance by technical experts and 
information resources and laboratory and quarantine stations. 
 
(4) Improvements in access to international negotiation and establishment of inquiry points and 
contact points in WTO to promote developing countries’ participation in negotiations.  
 
(5) Balancing scale economies and benefits from market liberalization; balanced development of 
centralized quality control system and competitive market systems for exports. 
 
In addition, as Finger and Schuler (1999) note, the cost of compliance with obligations 
related to the SPS Agreement, along with those on intellectual property rights and customs 
valuation, can exceed a full year’s development budget in the least developed countries. In Sub-
Saharan Africa, the least developed region in the world, many countries lack the technology 
available to support inspection capacities, while other countries adopt progressively more 
restrictive sanitary and phytosanitary standards.  
Issues for Negotiations  
 
The current positions taken by developing countries towards the agriculture negotiations 
were formulated to a large extent in preparatory work in advance of the WTO Seattle ministerial 
of September 1999. Developing country members of the WTO wanted a focus on 
implementation of existing obligations under the Uruguay Round SPS and TBT Agreements as 
part of discussions leading to a possible new multilateral round.  
 
Proposal in Advance of the Seattle Ministerial. The primary aspect of the developing 
country focus is noted in submissions in advance of Seattle concerning a lack of modern 
technical infrastructure and the capacity to (1) engage in international standards development 
activities, and  (2) provide internationally-recognized testing and certification procedures for 
their products. Without the resources necessary to build and maintain modern standards and 
conformity assessment systems, it is difficult to both ensure rights and exercise responsibilities 
under existing WTO rules. This theme was repeatedly referenced in regard to the foundations of 
rights and responsibilities in the WTO agreements tied to international standards. If developing 
countries lack resources to access information on international standards, or participate in their 
development, the link between the rule of law as specified in the WTO system and ability to 
fulfill and defend rights by developing countries is called into question. 
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Most developing-country submissions to the WTO leading to Seattle, therefore, 
recommended a targeted review of the SPS and TBT Agreements in light of development needs. 
One area of consensus related to implementation was the common position of developed and 
developing countries that issues of technical barriers to trade in goods be part of the embedded 
agenda of the WTO in 2000 in the 2
nd Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement. There were no 
recommendations by member to include the SPS or TBT Agreement within the negotiating 
framework of a new round. 
 
A major objective of developing countries reflected in positions for Seattle was further 
clarification of provisions regarding special and differential treatment under Article 10 of the 
SPS Agreement and Article 12 of the TBT Agreement. India, for example, recommended 
extending the timeframe for compliance by developing country members with existing 
provisions of WTO agreements referencing standards. Developing countries also raised the 
problems with the SPS and TBT notifications of new regulations by members. For example, 
notification of the intent to promulgate a new regulation with a 60-day comment rule provides 
questionable value to developing countries in the absence of capacities to react to new 
requirements on imports. Other proposals noted the lack in notifications of useful information on 
methodology or other factors linked to the regulations that might assist developing countries in 
commenting on new import rules.  
 
Concern over the use of environmental standards to restrict imports was also a consistent 
and prominent theme in developing country submissions to the WTO in preparation for the 
Seattle Ministerial. The issue of trade disciplines of the WTO and environmental standards was 
viewed with serious alarm by some developing countries in regard to both industrial goods and 
agricultural products. Among other issues, the lack of clear rules on the appropriate use of labels 
to indicate environmental impacts, and rise in use of standards for product and production 
measures in developed countries, were noted.  
 
Finally, a number of submissions to the WTO by developing countries raised the question 
of how and under what circumstances Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) are best 
implemented to facilitate trade. These agreements between governments seek to reduce technical 
barriers through recognition of equivalence of national product testing and certification 
procedures. To date they have only been negotiated between developed countries, but WTO 
members are specifically encouraged in the SPS and TBT Agreements to enter into MRAs. 
Whether developing countries will benefit with their implementation remains an issue related to 
MRAs as a means by which global trade is facilitated.  
 
The Agriculture Negotiations and Product Attributes. A number of key issues for 
developing countries are expressed in proposals submitted to the WTO as part of the agriculture 
negotiations through March 2001. The emphasis on developing country concerns at the WTO is 
also reflected in the involvement of the General Council in debate over implementation of the 
SPS and TBT Agreements for developing countries. 
 
The majority of submissions to the WTO on product attributes have centered on 
developing countries and the SPS Agreement. There is not a unified position being taken by all 
middle-income or least developed countries toward product attribute regulations. A number of  
55   
proposals under discussion reference equivalence and harmonization of standards and Article 4 
of the SPS Agreement. From developing country perspectives, concerns about harmonization 
center largely on problems in access to information and participation in international standards 
setting activities (World Bank 2000). Standards developed by CODEX, the IPPC and OIE can 
facilitate harmonization. However, limited resources in developing countries preclude access to 
active engagement in the development of international standards in many cases.  
 
It is difficult for most developing countries to have their standards accepted as equivalent 
by developed countries and MRAs are not feasible given the lack of modern facilities to test and 
certify in many countries. Even under conditions of technological parity between trading 
partners, such as the US, Europe and Japan, there is little evidence so far that MRAs have 
facilitated trade (Roberts et al in press).  
 
The proposal submitted by the Small Island Developing States (G/AG/NG/W97) to the 
WTO, along with several others, suggests access to appropriate technology to meet SPS 
standards and assistance to participate in international standards setting. These are first steps 
necessary before concrete progress can be made toward harmonization. Submissions by Cuba 
and other members in the Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Africa (G/AG/NG/W37) suggest that 
“failure to recognize equivalence of measures” is a major problem confronting developing 
countries. 
 
The requirements on the application of science and risk assessment in decision making 
have also been addressed in proposals by developing countries to the agriculture negotiations. 
From a developing country perspective, a problem with SPS regulations concerns the lack of 
consideration of dynamic benefits to economic development and trade under conditions in which 
acceptable risk is not set at zero tolerance levels. When combined with the lack of progress on 
harmonization of standards and options for importers to set regulation at nationally-defined 
levels, developing country exporters argue they are placed at a disadvantage.  
 
As noted for the case of aflatoxin standards in Europe, regulation at differing levels 
within a range of risk tolerances can have a significant impact on trade. Several proposals from 
developing countries reflect concern over balancing science and risk in the SPS Agreement. 
India (G/AG/NG/W102) argues that that overly strict SPS measures have denied market access 
opportunities for developed countries. Conversely, the Small Island Developing States 
(G/AG/NG/W97) suggest that developing countries should not be subject to risk assessment 
requirements when bans are imposed to protect bio-diversity and environmental balance. Other 
net food importing members have noted the importance of ensuring food safety standards are met 
by exporters (Mauritius, among others). Kenya has raised the need to ensure that imports meet 
international food safety standards so that exporters cannot divert lower quality exports to 
overseas markets (G/AG/NG/W/136). 
 
Discussions regarding the precautionary principle and food safety are important areas of 
focus for developing countries. The SPS Agreement provides flexibility for provisional or 
temporary measures under conditions in which scientific evidence is insufficient. The EU 
proposal on the precautionary principle, however, is counter to the implicit movement toward 
objective risk assessments based on international consensus science embedded in the SPS  
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Agreement. Broadening use of the SPS Agreement to provide a check against the use of new 
technology in agriculture is likely not consistent with needs to improve productivity in the 
developing world. The debate over GMOs in agriculture is therefore also of relevance to 
developing countries in the current negotiations. Whether consensus on labeling, harmonized 
conformity assessment mechanisms, or the need for regulation in this area at all can be achieved 
within the context of WTO negotiations is not certain. 
 
Developing countries also have a stake in the outcome of debate over the proposed 
recognition of the multi-functionality of agricultural production. The Europeans (EC 
Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, G/AG/NG/W/90) have suggested that non-trade concerns 
should be addressed in WTO agreements, including the SPS Agreement, in order to address 
environmental, consumer, and other needs. Poland and other Eastern European countries have 
expressed general support for inclusion of these topics in the negotiations. Animal welfare 
considerations in trade are included in this broad topic. To the extent recognition of non-trade 
concerns provides additional channels through which trade is restricted in agricultural 
commodities, net exporters from the least developed nations will be disadvantaged. At a 
minimum, detailed debate and negotiating resources devoted to issues that are not central to the 
basic functioning of the SPS Agreement in regard to notification, risk assessment and 
management techniques, and use of international standards, will delay progress in building on 
the foundations of the Agreement. India's submission (G/AG/NG/W/114) includes reference to 
similar notes of caution in this area. 
 
  Finally, some WTO members have suggested that special and differential treatment should 
include mandatory provision of technical assistance, or that longer phase-in periods be allowed for 
developing countries to implement obligations under the SPS and TBT Agreements. It is doubtful, 
however, that a focus on expansion of special and differential treatment is in the long-term 
interests of developing countries, especially the least developed in Asia and Africa. Integration 
into the WTO system requires a focus on the tools to implement commitments and exercise rights, 
not a process of special and differential treatment that provides an easy way to postpone necessary 
action on technical assistance.  
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Looking Forward Briefly 
 
 
This IATRC commissioned paper has summarized the state of affairs with respect to 
WTO rules about product attribute regulations, identified the key stresses in this area of trade 
relations, and evaluated the prospects for trade-liberalizing resolution of some of the current and 
potential disputes over attribute-based trade restrictions. Product attributes have become an 
important determinant of transactions costs in international trade and of the patterns of product 
movements, and are likely to be more significant in both respects in the coming years. The 
multilateral regime of trade restrictions based on product attributes transcends specific 
agreements within the WTO and has emerged as one of the over-arching issues to be addressed. 
Whether significantly strengthened integration of global agricultural markets can be achieved 
now rests as fully on what is determined about the regime for product attribute regulations as it 
does on whether average tariffs on farm products can be brought down significantly over the 
next ten or twenty years. 
 
The international regulatory regime concerned with product attributes faces stresses that 
were hardly anticipated in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Pests and pestilence have 
proliferated unexpectedly since 1994. Public confidence in the full availability of the scientific 
understanding required to keep a food supply safe and in the ability of regulatory agencies to 
ensure that safety has been shaken by mad cow disease. New outbreaks of foot and mouth 
disease in Europe and elsewhere have reminded those responsible for agricultural production 
systems of the need for constant vigilance about even the most well-known biological risks.  
 
Were these challenges not enough to bring into contention the nascent WTO efforts to 
discipline product attribute trade regulations, additional tensions have arisen as commercial agri-
food channels place emphasis on uniformity of products. Integrated market channels capable of 
delivering this uniformity have replaced independent entrepreneurs in the food distribution 
systems of some countries, and are on the way to doing so in others. At the same time, niche 
market demands are growing for specialty products that offer some form of high product-quality 
in the eyes of some consumers. This demand for quality creates specialized production and 
marketing opportunities, but only with strict attention to process-defined and product quality 
attributes. Definition of acceptable quality in both the mass and niche markets has differed 
among countries. Thus, the two market developments that are gaining strength, while potentially 
creating international trade opportunities, are also intensifying tensions among trade partners.  
  
As has been described in depth herein, the WTO agreements governing product attribute 
regulations that affect trade provide only limited disciplines on the various regulatory measures 
adopted among countries. The basic WTO mandate to achieve the benefits of expanded 
international trade is counterbalanced for product attribute policies by the assignment of explicit 
sovereign rights of nations to determine their levels of risk aversion and to set standards for other 
quality attributes. Across a wide array of regulatory decision making, these decisions are often 
highly contested within sovereign states, let alone between them. The WTO agreements do not 
mandate how countries weigh benefits and costs of their regulatory decisions, nor do they fully 
describe other aspects of an optimal regulatory regime. Instead, the agreements proscribe those 
measures that can be shown to result in egregious discrimination against trade.  
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The WTO disciplines have proven effective in a number of product attribute regulation 
cases brought to formal consultations or dispute resolution. There have been more of these 
highly visible cases than in the past because of strengthened WTO dispute settlement rules, and 
the outcomes have demonstrated that trade-restrictive regulations about product attributes can be 
challenged on their merits. The complainant has won the argument and the offending country has 
modified its policies accordingly in most cases.  
 
There are numerous product-attribute regulations that are contested less visibly. These 
cases are largely the subject of informal discussions and negotiations between affected industries 
and trade and regulatory agencies within the relevant countries. The WTO requirements for 
transparency of regulatory regimes have made it easier to identify and track contentious product 
attribute regulations, the few WTO panel rulings have a demonstration effect that underpins 
trade-liberalizing resolution of other disputes, and the discussions among affected parties are 
facilitated by the existence of the WTO committees. Still, concerns remain that many countries 
are setting risk aversion levels and product quality standards too conservatively when 
international trade is involved. In this event, they give up substantial gains from trade for very 
little risk protection or avoidance of other adverse consequences.  
 
The WTO agreements addressing product attributes have been less successful in their 
more subtle dimensions aimed at reducing transactions costs to trade resulting from diverse 
product attribute regulations. Countries have resisted substantial recognition of equivalence 
between national regulatory regimes as a basis for ensuring national treatment, nor has 
harmonization of standards yet proven effective in defining uniform standards multilaterally. The 
regionalization provisions of the SPS agreement are a strong testimony to the principle that 
regulation of pest risks need not be tied to national borders if such territorial demarcation lines 
are a sub-optimal basis for disease control, and to national regulatory agencies entrusting some 
enforcement obligations to their foreign counterparts. But only a few cases in which trade has 
been opened on the basis of regional assessments of risks can be cited. Perhaps more progress on 
equivalence, harmonization and regionalization will be able to be reported in the future. 
Increased recognition of the potential contribution of imports to economic welfare might lead to 
additional investments in regulatory infrastructure (including more risk assessors to speed 
equivalency determinations) that will facilitate trade while maintaining desired risk-related and 
other quality attribute standards.   
 
The growing importance of product attributes in modern markets raises the question of 
whether demand for heightened standards necessarily conflicts with further trade liberalization. 
This need not be the case. We have argued that the whole attributes/trade debate could 
constructively be turned to shift the focus from expanded trade as a threat to desired product 
attributes to expanded trade as a resource efficient means to achieve those attributes. Trade 
reality precedes trade policy in this respect, with the recent rise in trade of high-value raw and 
processed food products partly reflecting a quality sourcing objective. Regulatory policy related 
to product attributes could be less contentious if imposition of new standards was accompanied 
by greater market access for products meeting those standards.   
 
In other respects, there is growing apprehension about the integrity of the global trading 
system as demand arises for specific product attributes. Despite some powerful economic forces  
59   
that promote integration of global markets, GMO policy regimes appear to be increasingly 
bifurcated. This could split the world into adoptive and nonadoptive regions and exacerbate trade 
tensions across the divide. The economic costs of regionalization of GMO policy, and related 
trade restrictions, could be high—indeed one wonders just how far such bifurcation will go given 
the real costs. The GMO regulatory issues are new: there remains fluidity in technology 
development and determination of regulatory regimes. Yet if positions harden and a rigid 
bifurcation of policy emerges less than ten years after GMO crop production took off in the mid 
1990s, it could set back agricultural trade liberalization in much the way that excluding 
agriculture from the GATT has postponed reform by nearly half a century. 
 
A second source of apprehension arises from developing countries, many of which feel 
burdened by either the requirements to justify their product attribute trade regulations, by the 
increasing standards required of their export products, or both. To the extent that regulatory 
authorities adopt stringent regimes without full consideration of their costs, those costs (but few 
benefits) may fall hard on developing countries, as described for proposed EU aflatoxin 
standards. To the extent that product standards are market-demand driven, the markets will 
squeeze out inefficient firms, regardless of location. Private resources will be forthcoming to 
meet the standards when profitable opportunities can be captured, and there is room for public 
technical assistance to developing countries both to strengthen their own regulatory regimes and 
to meet the standards required in international markets. 
 
With all of these issues at play, the current round of agriculture negotiations can be 
characterized as one in which governments are seeking additional latitude, discipline or clarity 
with respect to their multilateral commitments regarding product attribute regulations. The case 
for additional clarity about the existing legal obligations is strong. Simply dismissing as 
protectionist any initiative to discuss risk management principles, the regulation of production 
and processing methods, or labeling regimes not only hardens opposition to further trade 
liberalization among some constituency groups, it also squanders an important opportunity to 
examine how trade can contribute to providing consumers with desired products in the most cost-
effective manner. Progress in terms of these issues will depend on abandoning the polarizing 
debate over which objectives are legitimate and instead focusing on the requirement that policy 
regimes that are adopted provide the means for achieving a stated objective that is the least trade 
restrictive. A useful first step for those who propose increased product attribute regulations 
would be to identify, for example, how production and processing method regulations can be 
formulated so that all producers have the opportunity to compete in markets. Regulatory 
proposals that advance measures not coincidentally favorable toward domestic production 
circumstances, or that indicate a willingness to fund technical assistance for developing countries 
to enter marketing channels, or that consider independent, third-party certification authorities, 
could help dispel suspicion that consumer concerns are addressed only when it is politically 
expedient to do so. Those who favor less national regulation about product attributes are likewise 
challenged to offer explanations and examples of when and how the market, or the market in 
tandem with limited government intervention, provides optimal (and often more agile) solutions 
to matching product availability with evolving consumer preferences. Refusal to engage in this 
debate will not forestall consumers’ interest in certain product quality attributes; indeed, those 
who wish to export to some markets have already found that the requirements of private firms 
exceed those found in WTO negotiating proposals.  
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Contrary to the case for additional clarity, proposals that seek additional latitude for 
policy interventions may obfuscate the language of the WTO disciplines on product attribute 
regulations. To the extent that the negotiations provide more latitude for countries to respond to 
revealed or perceived domestic demands for product standards with regulatory decision making, 
the goal of the WTO should be to ensure that this latitude does not limit trade. Some of the calls 
for additional regulatory latitude may be designed with other social goals in mind, and to this 
extent are disingenuous when cast as questions of regulatory policy related to product attributes. 
Surely the WTO has to draw the line and say that there is not latitude in defining product 
attributes to call “home grown” an attribute that trade-restricting regulations can enforce! 
Perhaps no proposal on the table in the agriculture negotiations is quite so brazen, but some tilt in 
this direction is evident when their content is given careful analysis. 
 
The most difficult of the three issues to address is whether stronger disciplines on product 
attribute regulations should be sought in the WTO agreements through the current negotiations. 
There is a consensus not to reopen the SPS and TBT agreements formally, if only because 
everyone fears losing control of such a process. Still, language could be included in a new 
agriculture agreement that would strengthen those aspects of the WTO rules that require 
scientific risk assessments, limit deviations from international standards, or otherwise tighten the 
criteria for a legitimate product attribute regulation. 
 
The problems with writing additional disciplines into the WTO rules are at least twofold. 
First, put simply, it is difficult to write language to effectively impose general criteria on specific 
cases of regulation, the merits of which most often have to be ascertained on a case-specific 
basis. Second, as noted above, regulatory decision making within member countries about 
product attributes that affect trade is part of a larger contest over regulation domestically. Within 
this larger debate, economics suggests the merit of market-based solutions over rigid command 
and control rules, of careful assessments of the costs of regulation, and of weighing the costs and 
benefits that are derived. The non-separablity of domestic and trade policies has been recognized 
under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the legitimacy of the WTO in setting limits on 
domestic policy regimes has been established. This principle applies to product attribute 
regulations as well. But it is unrealistic to expect WTO disciplines alone to resolve food safety 
and quality regulatory debates: the trade tail will not wag the domestic dog. 
  
Acknowledging these limitations about what can be accomplished in the current 
international negotiations is not to preclude the WTO from serving a useful role in disciplining 
product attribute regulation multilaterally. The effort to secure global integration of agricultural 
markets can limit regulatory excesses when those excesses blatantly restrict trade. This will 
pressure countries to weigh benefits and costs more carefully than they otherwise would—and 
the WTO provides an institutional setting for market participants likely to bear the costs to be 
heard. This is exactly analogous with the role of the WTO in traditional trade policy. How much 
will be accomplished on global agricultural market integration in the current round of 
negotiations remains at question. But odds seem at least even for as much progress in the next 
decade on limiting product attribute restrictions on trade as for progress reducing other 
agricultural trade barriers. 
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